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AGAINST MARTYRDOM: A LIBERAL ARGUMENT
FOR ACCOMMODATION OF RELIGION
Paul Horwitz*
INTRODUCTION
The debate between liberty and equality is at a particularly fierce, fertile,
and interesting pass in the United States. Like many such conflicts over irreconcilable fundamental values, this struggle is always present but not always
prominent. Often, it merely ticks away in the background while other
issues—political, doctrinal, or theoretical—take center stage. From time to
time, however, it vaults into the foreground, recapturing the attention not
only of the academics in their hives, but of public commentators and the
public itself. This is such a moment.1 At the heart of the current conflict are
© 2016 Paul Horwitz. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Gordon Rosen Professor, University of Alabama School of Law; Visiting Professor,
Harvard Law School. I am grateful to the editors of the Notre Dame Law Review for the
invitation to participate in the Law Review Symposium on the anniversary of Dignitatis
Humanae and for the comments of my fellow panelists on that occasion. A draft of this
Article was presented at a faculty workshop at Harvard Law School, and I am grateful to
Gabriella Blum, Avihay Dorfman, Richard Fallon, Noah Feldman, Gerald Frug, Benjamin
Sachs, Steve Sachs, and Adrian Vermeule for questions and comments; to Netta BarakCorren, Abe Delnore, Christopher Lund, Michael Moreland, Eric Rassbach, and Mark
Rosen for comments on a written draft; and to Sean Nelson for excellent research
assistance.
1 For recent examples, see Mary Anne Case, Why “Live-and-Let-Live” Is Not a Viable
Solution to the Difficult Problems of Religious Accommodation in the Age of Sexual Civil Rights, 88 S.
CAL. L. REV. 463 (2015) (arguing that requests for accommodations of religious liberty
pose threats to equality), Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014 U.
ILL. L. REV. 839 (proposing that with regard to issues of sexual morality, the positions of
those advocating for equality and those invoking religious liberty are reconcilable), and
Steven D. Smith, Die and Let Live? The Asymmetry of Accommodation, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 703
(2015) (suggesting that the conflict between equality and religious liberty in the context of
“culture wars” involves serious risks for both sides). Jennifer Pizer frames nicely, if somewhat partially, both the longstanding nature of the conflict and its recurrent, generational
nature:
Our twin constitutional commitments to liberty—specifically religious liberty—
and to equality may be seen to pose challenging puzzles when the religious
demands of some threaten harm to others. The task of managing tensions
1301
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two of the most prominent repeat players: religion, or religious groups, and
the state.
Equality, and the power and legitimacy of the state to ensure it, are currently and decidedly in the ascendant.2 On the other side, religious accommodation—as a fact and as a concept—is in eclipse, vulnerable both
politically and intellectually.3 The ranks of vocal supporters of religious
accommodation, which sometimes swell to include the vast majority of representatives of the political branches4 and liberal public and academic commentators,5 have thinned out, and the lines of political division on this issue
have become more substantially partisan and religious.6 Stock in accommodationism is selling fast and cheap.
Two aspects of this period of realignment are particularly striking. The
first is the relative absence of pluralism from the discussion. That it exists as
between such conflicting claims is not new. But in each generation, the puzzles
are novel in their particulars and can seem more challenging than the earlier
ones because our society continually diversifies.
Jennifer C. Pizer, Navigating the Minefield: Hobby Lobby and Religious Accommodation in the
Age of Civil Rights, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 1 (2015).
2 See, e.g., STEVEN D. SMITH, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
11 (2014) (arguing that religious freedom is currently jeopardized by “secular egalitarians”); Richard W. Garnett, Religious Accommodations and—and Among—Civil Rights: Separation, Toleration, and Accommodation, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 493, 501–02 (2015) (suggesting that
in “current academic and political debates,” an equality-centered view that sees “religious
authorities, religious teachings, and religious believers’ claims or requests for accommodations as obstacles to the civil rights enterprise[ ] is, or is becoming, the prevailing one”);
Marc O. DeGirolami, Free Exercise By Moonlight, SAN DIEGO L. REV. (forthcoming 2016),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2587216 (manuscript at 5) (describing recent resistance to religious accommodation as being “in the service of equality as the
master value of our time”); Steven D. Smith, Religious Freedom and Its Enemies, or Why the
Smith Decision May Be a Greater Loss Now Than It Was Then, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2033,
2045–53 (2011) (describing “a larger movement that we might describe as secular egalitarianism” and arguing that “there are reasons to doubt the capacity or willingness of secular
egalitarianism to cherish religious freedom”).
3 See, e.g., DeGirolami, supra note 2 (manuscript at 4–5).
4 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209, 209–11 (1994) (discussing the political support for the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2012)).
5 See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154, 168–69,
169 nn.103–04 & 106–08 (2014) (collecting examples); Brett H. McDonnell, The Liberal
Case for Hobby Lobby, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 777, 784–85 (2015) (same).
6 With greater eloquence and palpable concern, Thomas Berg writes:
The contraception litigation thus reflects, and may accelerate, a trend in which
Americans’ divisions over economic regulation reinforce their divisions over cultural matters. At least in the most prominent public rhetoric, we see fewer crosscutting disagreements, and more that line up so as to harden the divisions. If
Americans further separate into religious conservative opponents of regulation
and secular, progressive proponents of regulation, polarization is likely to
become increasingly unhealthy.
Thomas C. Berg, Religious Accommodation and the Welfare State, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 103,
104 (2015) [hereinafter Berg, Welfare].
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a social fact, as a “claim of descriptive sociology[ ] that the sources of social
organization are many, not one,” is not in question.7 Nor is there any disagreement with the standard liberal view that the presence of “a variety of
reasonable comprehensive doctrines and conceptions of the good . . . is the
very condition of modern constitutional democracies.”8 But normative arguments for religious and other forms of pluralism—strong positive claims that
we should “allow[ ] a plurality of associations, cultures, religions, and so on,
to follow their own various norms”9—are not major presences in the current
discussion.
This is hardly inevitable. The Declaration on Religious Liberty,
Dignitatis Humanae, whose fiftieth anniversary we mark here, was deeply influenced by both descriptive and normative views of moral and religious pluralism, and specifically by the American experience of religious pluralism (or at
least an idealized account of that experience).10 But that sort of argument
has not featured much in a debate that is so centered on a stark opposition
between liberty and equality that any tertium quid is forgotten or ignored. To
the extent that pluralism figures in the current discussion, it is more as a
technical problem: something to be acknowledged and certainly not reviled,
but above all to be managed.11
The second, and clearly related, point of note is the dominance on the
ascendant egalitarian side of the debate of a particular strand of liberalism.
Jacob Levy calls it a “rationalist” strand of liberalism, one that is “committed
to intellectual progress, universalism, and equality before a unified law,
opposed to arbitrary and irrational distinctions and inequalities, and determined to disrupt local tyrannies in religious and ethnic groups, closed
associations, [and] families.”12 With this form of liberalism in the driver’s
seat, it is unsurprising that normative pluralism doesn’t feature much in the
debate. Nor is it surprising that the focus is on the centrality and inevitability
7 JACOB T. LEVY, RATIONALISM, PLURALISM, AND FREEDOM 27 (2015).
8 LUCAS SWAINE, THE LIBERAL CONSCIENCE 76 (2006); see also JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM 35–40 (1996).
9 LEVY, supra note 7, at 27.
10 See Paul VI, Declaration Dignitatis Humanae (Dec. 7, 1965), http://www.vatican.va/
archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651207_dignitatishumanae_en.html.
11 Occasionally, one does see concerns voiced from other corners about whether the
current triumphs for equality are doing an adequate job of acknowledging and embracing
other forms of pluralism. See, e.g., Leonore Carpenter & David S. Cohen, A Union Unlike
Any Other: Obergefell and the Doctrine of Marital Superiority, 104 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 124 (2015)
(arguing that the Supreme Court’s Obergefell opinion elevates the institution of marriage at
the expense of equality); Nan D. Hunter, Interpreting Liberty and Equality Through the Lens of
Marriage, 6 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 107 (2015) (same); Clare Huntington, Obergefell’s Conservatism: Reifying Familial Fronts, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 23 (2015) (same); R.A. Lenhardt, Marriage as Black Citizenship?, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1317 (2015) (lamenting “marriage’s role in
racial subordination”); Serena Mayeri, Marriage (In)Equality and the Historical Legacies of Feminism, 6 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 126 (2015).
12 LEVY, supra note 7, at 2.
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of state power13 and its capacity to regulate public interaction and alter private attitudes.14
Any debate so stark and polarized cries out for, and inevitably will beget,
alternative perspectives. The conflict between liberty and equality in the late
1980s and 1990s resulted in a minority literature rich in normative pluralism
and communitarianism. Today, it is beginning to produce writers eager to
reengage with the value of pluralism, both as a distinctive approach of its
own15 and as a reminder that there are other resources within liberalism
besides the rationalist strand. Those resources include a pluralist liberalism
that is “skeptical of the central state and friendly toward local, customary,
voluntary, or intermediate bodies, communities, and associations,”16 and that
emphasizes the importance of “recognizing a plurality of norms regarding
how best to live, especially considering the tenuous grounding the state has
to insist on its position at all times.”17
Drawing in part on that literature, and in sympathy with the desire to
reaffirm the importance of religious freedom and the accommodation of
religious groups and practices without opposing or disdaining liberalism or
progressivism altogether,18 this Article offers a liberal argument in favor of
13 See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, “Freedom of the Church” and the Authority of the State, 21 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 145, 146 (2013) (“Religion is a value that the state is morally bound
to respect and, under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, is legally bound to
respect. Conflicts arise, however, between religious and other values. Adjudicating conflicts is the job of the state. So there’s no getting around the fact that the freedom of the
church is subordinate to the authority of the state.”); see also id. at 152–54, 156–57.
14 For interesting and nuanced recent work on this subject that both complements
and cuts against the central argument made here, see Netta Barak-Corren, Does Anti-Discrimination Law Influence Religious Behavior? Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications, 67 HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 2016) [hereinafter Barak-Corren, Empirical Evidence], http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2627808; Netta Barak-Corren, Compliance
with the Law Under Religion-Based Normative Conflicts: A Behavioral Analysis and Preliminary Prescriptions (Mar. 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://blogs.harvard.edu/
hnmcp/files/2013/06/FSP-Winner-Updated-Compliance-with-the-Law-Under-ReligionBased-Normative-Conflicts.pdf. For a normative argument that the law should regulate
religious groups and their practices, albeit on a neutral, generally applicable basis, in order
to assist in achieving a “broad scale change in social and cultural values” in favor of equality, see for example Jane Rutherford, Equality as the Primary Constitutional Value: The Case for
Applying Employment Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1049, 1126 (1996).
15 The work of John Inazu is the most relevant here, although my prediction, and
hope, is that this literature will be added to over the next few years. See JOHN D. INAZU,
CONFIDENT PLURALISM (forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2612122; John D. Inazu, A Confident Pluralism, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 587 (2015).
For a valuable, recent collection of essays considering the contemporary relationship
among religion, pluralism, and politics and law, see AFTER PLURALISM: REIMAGINING RELIGIOUS ENGAGEMENT (Courtney Bender & Pamela E. Klassen eds., 2010).
16 LEVY, supra note 7, at 2.
17 Abner S. Greene, Religious Freedom and (Other) Civil Liberties: Is There a Middle
Ground?, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 161, 193 (2015).
18 The most forthright and interesting proponent of this position is Thomas Berg. See
Thomas C. Berg, Partly Acculturated Religion and Religious Freedom, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
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the legal accommodation of religion, including the accommodation of illiberal religious groups and practices. Although my own work is substantially
pluralist in orientation,19 the argument here is intended to appeal directly to
more “rationalist” liberals.20
The main argument here, as I make clear in a moment, is narrow. But
the subjects touched on are somewhat broader. One subsidiary goal of this
Article is to argue, albeit more implicitly than explicitly, that the current discussion of religious accommodation, and our culture wars more broadly, are
missing a sense of pluralism—religious and otherwise—as a positive value to
be welcomed, not a problem to be managed. The second is to spotlight and
respond to a pair of essays by Mark Tushnet. Along with Dignitatis Humanae
itself, these articles are the inspiration, or spur, for this Article. Written a
decade and a half apart, taken together, the essays provide one of the more
interesting arguments against the accommodation of religion. The arguments Tushnet makes there deserve serious attention from those who support religious accommodation on theological or religion-friendly, as opposed
to liberal or religion-neutral, grounds.21
Nonetheless, the argument made here is not theological. Nor, although
I understand it to be underwritten by a normative commitment to pluralism,
does it require the reader to share that commitment. It is a pragmatic argument, consistent with general liberal views, about the benefits of religious
1341 (2016); Thomas C. Berg, Progressive Arguments for Religious Organizational Freedom:
Reflections on the HHS Mandate, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 279 (2013) [hereinafter Berg,
Progressive Arguments]; Berg, Welfare, supra note 6. This Article’s argument is, I think, complementary to but distinct from the arguments Berg has made in his work.
19 See, e.g., PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS (2013); Paul Horwitz,
Churches as First Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
79 (2009); Paul Horwitz, Defending (Religious) Institutionalism, 99 VA. L. REV. 1049 (2013);
Paul Horwitz, Grutter’s First Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 461 (2005); Paul Horwitz, Permeable
Sovereignty and Religious Liberty, 49 TULSA L. REV. 235 (2013); Paul Horwitz, The Sources and
Limits of Freedom of Religion in a Liberal Democracy: Section 2(a) and Beyond, 54 U. TORONTO
FAC. L. REV. 1 (1996); Paul Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions: Some Easy
Answers and Hard Questions, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1497 (2007).
20 See LEVY, supra note 7, at 2.
21 See Mark Tushnet, Accommodation of Religion Thirty Years On, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER
1 (2015) [hereinafter Tushnet, Thirty Years On]; Mark Tushnet, In Praise of Martyrdom?, 87
CALIF. L. REV. 1117 (1999) [hereinafter Tushnet, Martyrdom]. The latter article in particular, although rarely cited by others and not cited at all in his 2015 article on accommodation—although I think the two are properly read as a matched pair—deserves much wider
attention. A more direct companion to Tushnet’s piece on martyrdom is Mark V. Tushnet,
Questioning the Value of Accommodating Religion, in LAW AND RELIGION: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 245 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000). For other work on (and skeptical of) religious
accommodation by Tushnet, although it receives less attention here, see Mark Tushnet,
“Of Church and State and the Supreme Court”: Kurland Revisited, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 373, Mark
Tushnet, The Emerging Principle of Accommodation of Religion (Dubitante), 76 GEO. L.J. 1691
(1988), and Mark Tushnet, The Underside of Mandatory Accommodations of Religion, 26 CAP. U.
L. REV. 1 (1997). Also relevant to the argument made here is his recent book review, Mark
Tushnet, Liberals, Litigants, and the Disappearance of Consensus About the Religion Clauses, 93
TEX. L. REV. 207 (2014) (reviewing SMITH, supra note 2).
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accommodation and the costs—including the unintended costs to equality—
of the refusal to accommodate. It is as much consequentialist as normative.
The argument, in brief, is that refusals to accommodate that arise from
opposition to, or concerns about, illiberal groups or practices may actually
reinforce rather than reduce illiberalism. More specifically, they may do both.
Refusals to accommodate, and the strong public insistence that religious
communities comply strictly with and, in Nancy Rosenblum’s words, follow
the “logic of congruence” with liberal norms,22 may cause some groups, or
some members of those groups, to alter their beliefs or conform their conduct to liberal norms of equality and nondiscrimination. It may also push
some religious individuals and communities to become more strongly
attached to illiberal beliefs and practices.
One might still conclude on consequentialist grounds that the game is
worth the candle. As long as the number of “liberalized” groups or individuals exceeds the number of “illiberalized” groups or individuals, the refusal to
accommodate is still both justified and salutary. But part of the cost that
must be factored in here is the intensity of the illiberal group’s
(re)attachment to illiberal beliefs and practices, and the degree to which that
group becomes more insular, more disconnected from the wider liberal society. The more emphatic and categorical the refusal to accommodate, the
more likely it is that some groups or individuals will become more polarized
and more insular in relation to the larger society. To use a phrase that has
figured in recent discussions among and about traditionalist religious
groups, they will turn to the “Benedict option,” “ceas[ing] to identify the
continuation of civility and moral community with the maintenance of American empire,” and “keen[ly] . . . construct[ing] local forms of community as
loci of Christian [or other religions’] resistance against what the empire represents.”23 That result, for both practical and normative reasons, is something many liberals want, or should want, to avoid.
22 NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS 4, 36–41 (1998); see also Robert C.
Post & Nancy L. Rosenblum, Introduction, in CIVIL SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT 1, 13 (Nancy
L. Rosenblum & Robert C. Post eds., 2002) (describing the logic of congruence as the
belief that civil society should “reflect[ ] common [liberal] values and practices ‘all the way
down’” and observing that “[c]ongruence is often advocated with regard to the egalitarian
norms of liberal democracy. The claim is that the internal lives of associations should
mirror public norms of equality, nondiscrimination, due process, and so on.”).
23 Rod Dreher, Benedict Option FAQ, AM. CONSERVATIVE (Oct. 6, 2015, 2:00 PM), http:/
/www.theamericanconservative.com/dreher/benedict-option-faq/. The “Benedict” in
“Benedict option” refers to St. Benedict, who “left Rome . . . out of disgust with its decadence” and pursued a hermit’s existence, eventually forming a strictly ruled monastic
order. Id. The story of St. Benedict and the argument for turning inward in response to a
decadent or unfriendly “empire” and building insular communities as conservators of traditions and bulwarks against the “new dark ages” that inspired the “Benedict option” is
taken from ALASDAIR MCINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 263 (3d ed. 2007). But it has resonances
with some of the statements made by a contemporary Benedict, Pope Benedict XVI, who
speculated prior to his pontificate that the Roman Catholic Church might find itself
“exist[ing] in small, seemingly insignificant groups that nonetheless live in an intensive
struggle against evil and bring the good into the world—that let God in.” JOSEPH CARDINAL
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The value of this argument does not lie in its novelty so much as its
timeliness and, I hope, its acceptability. It is not novel, although it is more
uncommon in the legal and political literature on religious accommodation
than one would expect.24 In a sense, that is part of its value. Arguments that
government efforts to tame or suppress illiberal groups can reinforce or exacerbate illiberalism, sometimes to a dangerous degree, are familiar and
accepted in other areas of law and policy. That provides some basis to find it
plausible here, and thus to change the tenor, or lower the temperature, of
the conversation on religious accommodation. Importantly, it offers grounds
for liberal acceptance of accommodation, at a time when the conversation
seems to have polarized between religious conservative arguments for accommodation, on the one hand, and liberal or progressive resistance or antagonism toward accommodation on the other.
Some discussion of the limited scope of the argument is necessary. First,
this is a liberal argument for religious accommodation, not a theological argument—although, as I have noted, I will address Tushnet’s theological arguments against accommodation.
Second, by “liberal” I mean something general and colloquial, not technical and philosophical. In the next Part, I offer some specification of what
“liberalism” entails, drawing on some of the standard liberal literature. Still,
for the most part I have in mind the general views, values, and modes of
thinking of the average citizen who thinks of himself or herself as having a
conventional “liberal” or “progressive” worldview. Some of the descriptions
and arguments below—both Part I’s description of standard liberal fears
about religious illiberalism and resistance to religious accommodation, and
the liberal argument for accommodation presented in Part II—are as much
practical, pragmatic, and consequentialist as they are “liberal” in any deeper
philosophical sense. My goal here, however, is to describe the kinds of views
that characterize the average liberal citizen, and to provide arguments for
accommodation (including pragmatic ones) that are available to such average citizens—that are consistent with their general thinking and vocabulary
and with the kinds of management tools they treat as available within that
worldview. Although the Article operates at a degree of abstraction from our
own Constitution, it is meant to respond to real-world resistance to religious
RATZINGER, SALT OF THE EARTH 16 (1996); see also id. at 222 (envisioning that the Church
“will live in small, vital circles of really convinced believers who live their faith”); JOSEPH
RATZINGER & MARCELLO PERA, WITHOUT ROOTS 120 (Michael F. Moore trans., 2006)
(emphasizing the importance of “convinced minorities in the Church”). Although the
words are not Benedict’s, his views were associated during his papacy with interest in a
“‘smaller-but-purer’ church.” DAVID GIBSON, THE RULE OF BENEDICT: POPE BENEDICT XVI
AND HIS BATTLE WITH THE MODERN WORLD 13, 16 (2006); see also Joseph A. Komonchak, “A
Smaller but Purer Church”?, COMMONWEAL (Oct. 21, 2010, 9:07 AM), https://www.common
wealmagazine.org/blog/smaller-purer-church (tracing the source of the phrase “smaller
but purer Church” and noting that it is not Benedict’s “own expression, although many
people attribute the idea to him”).
24 For the most direct arguments on this point, see SWAINE, supra note 8, and, to a
lesser extent, JEFF SPINNER-HALEV, SURVIVING DIVERSITY (2000).
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accommodation, and to appeal to real-world “liberals.” Although the argument presented here ought to appeal to more philosophically serious liberals, they are not the primary audience, and the version of liberalism I
describe and appeal to below is messier than that—just as real-world liberal
views are messier than academic views.
Third, the argument is about the general idea of legal accommodation
of religious practices, not its particular form. It does not stake out a strong
position on whether those accommodations are or should be entrenched in
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, or whether they are simply a
permissive option for legislators and other political actors.
Fourth, although I do offer some suggestions on these points, this Article does not attempt to provide detailed answers to questions such as what
form legal review of such accommodations should take, how extensive their
scope should be, and how courts should conduct inquiries where a potential
claim of a statutory or constitutional right to accommodation lies. In cases of
targeted accommodation of specified conduct,25 for example, such as a law
allowing members of the armed forces to wear “neat and conservative” religious apparel like crucifixes or turbans,26 it does not tell us whether a claimant can or must be required to show a sincere personal belief that the
apparel is required for religious reasons. In cases of general statutory or constitutional rights to religious accommodations where a legal obligation
imposes a “substantial burden” on religious practice, as under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act,27 it does not tell us how courts should evaluate the
existence of a burden or its substantial nature, a question the Supreme Court
will evaluate this term in Zubik v. Burwell.28
Finally, this Article focuses on religious accommodation. In so doing, it
brackets larger questions about whether religious accommodation is possible
or sustainable if “religion” itself is too broad or indistinct as a category,29 or if
it is difficult or unprincipled to grant accommodation to “religion” and not
to other categories of strongly held belief and practice.30 If this Article were
strictly concerned with American constitutional law, this constraint might not
be worth foregrounding in this manner. Whatever the theoretical or philosophical difficulties with treating religion as a “special” category, it is plausibly identified as such by the Constitution.31 But it is worth noting here
25 See, e.g., Tushnet, Thirty Years On, supra note 21, at 13–15 (discussing targeted
accommodations).
26 10 U.S.C. § 774(b)(2) (2012).
27 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (2012).
28 136 S. Ct. 444 (2015), granting cert. to Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Heath &
Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2015).
29 For a recent collection discussing such issues from a variety of perspectives, see
POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (Winnifred Fallers Sullivan et al. eds., 2015).
30 See, e.g., BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2012); James W. Nickel, Who Needs
Freedom of Religion?, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 941 (2005); Micah Schwartzman, What if Religion Is
Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351 (2012).
31 See Schwartzman, supra note 30, at 1426 (“As a legal matter . . . we cannot ignore the
constitutional text that we have inherited. And so the idea that religion must be special is
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because this Article operates at a level of abstraction from any particular constitutional text or doctrine.
All these are obviously important questions. The questions which or
what sort of “burdens” ought to be accommodated, whether those burdens
must be understood and accommodations administered in strictly secular
terms or with deference to the claimants’ religious assertions,32 and how to
balance accommodations against competing interests, are the ones currently
causing the most difficulties for the courts and arousing the most academic
discussion. The difficulties that accompany the technology of religious
accommodation—problems of how to shape legislative accommodations and
how to administer statutory or constitutional rights to accommodation—provide an independent reason to worry about the viability of religious accommodation even if it is justified in principle.
Nevertheless, I believe the narrow intervention provided here is useful
and necessary, and that it has implications for some of the current debates
over the American legal doctrine of religious accommodation. On the first
point, it matters because of the re-contestation over the very idea of religious
accommodation that we are currently experiencing. Until recently, the
broad consensus favored some form of religious accommodation, whether
permissive and political, or mandatory and available as a constitutional
claim to be administered by judges.33 Of course it was subject to important
disagreement about particulars, and of course there were doubters. But general support for accommodation was sufficiently widespread that “disagreement over religious accommodations was a background issue, not a
foreground issue.”34 That is no longer true. Religious accommodation as a
unavoidable. The text simply makes it so.”). As Schwartzman points out, one might still
view this as “a reason for moral regret” and seek to mitigate it through positive law or
constitutional interpretation. Id. at 1427.
32 For recent work on this question, see for example Michael A. Helfand, Identifying
Substantial Burdens, U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2728952, Frederick Mark Gedicks, ‘Substantial’ Burdens: How Courts
May (and Why They Must) Judge Burdens on Religion Under RFRA (BYU Law Research Paper
No. 15-18, Feb. 20, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2657733,
and Chad Flanders, Insubstantial Burdens (June 2015) (unpublished manuscript) http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2727423.
33 See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY 5 (2013).
34 Horwitz, supra note 5, at 159. It bears emphasis both that consensus is not unanimity, and that identifying a disagreement as a background rather than a foreground issue is
not the same thing as calling that disagreement insignificant. My claim is simply that consensus favored the general idea of accommodation, especially once it was abstracted to
include both mandatory/judicial and permissive/legislative accommodation, that disagreement on this question was not the main ground of battle within even the American legal
interpretive community, and that it certainly did not possess much “social salience” outside
that community. Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context in Interpretive Theory, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1804 (1997). Although I think that is an accurate
description of the degree of consensus over religious accommodation until recently and of
its background status, it is certainly true that there has always been disagreement about
accommodation. For a critical response to my account of religious accommodation as a
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liberal value is increasingly under question in both academic and public
discussion.35
That contestation can matter at the level of implementation as well as
the level of theory. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s continuing support for the general possibility of religious accommodation,36 the lower
courts that actually handle most of the religious accommodation caseload
have shown an increasing willingness to push the doctrine in favor of more
aggressive judicial scrutiny of religious claimants’ assertions of a substantial
burden.37 While religious accommodation remains available to federal,
state, or local political actors, those accommodations have been the subject
of widespread public attention and debate.38 And the polarization of that

background issue, see Elizabeth Sepper, Reports of Accommodation’s Death Have Been Greatly
Exaggerated, 128 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 24 (2014).
35 See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, Are the Welfare State and Religious Freedom Incompatible?, 8 ST.
THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171, 175–76 (2014) (noting that “[m]ore and more voices from
the left reject virtually any religious-freedom exception from generally applicable laws”).
36 See Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015) (agreeing unanimously that the Arkansas
Department of Corrections’ refusal to accommodate a prisoner who wished for religious
reasons to grow a half-inch beard violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2012)); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (upholding the RFRA claim to religious accommodation from the
so-called “contraceptive mandate” under regulations promulgated by the Department of
Health and Human Services pursuant to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.
Although the vote in Hobby Lobby was 5-4, and Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion
emphasized that “the government’s license to grant religion-based accommodations from
generally applicable laws is constrained by the Establishment Clause,” id. at 2802 n.25
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting), no members of the Court questioned the availability in principle
of “religion-based accommodations.” Of course the outcomes in these cases can be viewed
as having more to do with compliance with Congress’s directives than with support for
religious accommodation as such. But the Court could interpret statutory religious accommodations extremely narrowly, or hold that they are impermissible under the Establishment Clause. Although, as I discuss in the text above, lower courts have taken the first
approach more aggressively in response to Hobby Lobby and some Justices clearly favor the
same strategy, the current balance on the Court is certainly not opposed to religious
accommodation tout court; and the last Justice to argue strongly against even statutory religious accommodations on Establishment Clause grounds, Justice John Paul Stevens, did not
think they were forbidden altogether. Compare City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536
(1997) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“In my opinion, [RFRA] is a ‘law respecting an establishment of religion’ that violates the First Amendment to the Constitution.”), with Andrew
Koppelman, Justice Stevens, Religious Enthusiast, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 567, 572, 580 (2012)
(noting that Justice Stevens joined the majority in some accommodation cases, both statutory and constitutional, and concluding that “Justice Stevens has Establishment Clause worries, but they do not preclude every religious accommodation”).
37 See, e.g., Helfand, supra note 32, at 11, 15–17 (arguing that lower courts have
“expressed a new version of substantial burden skepticism by advancing a narrow interpretation of RFRA’s provisions that limited the category of what qualified as a substantial
burden”).
38 See id. at 2–3 (collecting examples).
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debate along culture-war lines,39 with liberal and secularist lines hardening
against accommodation and the pro-accommodationist position more likely
to stem from, or to be associated with, specifically religious and traditionalist
views is likely to heighten legal and political contestation about accommodation. A specifically liberal argument for accommodation thus has particular
importance today. And, as I will suggest at the end of the Article, it has implications for the doctrinal discussion as well, although that is not my primary
focus here.
In the Parts that follow, I first provide an admittedly stylized outline of a
standard liberal argument against religious accommodation, one centered
on concerns about illiberal groups and practices and their effects on members as well as outsiders. The next Part lays out the particular liberal defense
of accommodation that is this Article’s main contribution. I then explore the
relationship between that argument and arguments about religious accommodation and “martyrdom,” including Tushnet’s largely theological argument against accommodation and, in a qualified sense, “in praise of
martyrdom.” I argue here that whatever merits attach to the argument from
a theological perspective—and I think they are real, but limited—the liberal
perspective should seek to avoid creating religious martyrs, and that this is a
good reason to favor religious accommodation in principle. I then discuss
the implications of the liberal anti-martyrdom argument for religious accommodation for judges in religious accommodation cases.
I. THE ILLIBERALISM-FEARING ARGUMENT AGAINST RELIGIOUS
ACCOMMODATION
In this Part, I outline a standard liberal concern about religious accommodation, one that can lead to substantial skepticism towards or opposition
to religious accommodation. This is the perennial problem of “the position
of ‘illiberal’ groups in liberal society.”40 Call this the “illiberalism-fearing”
argument. My goal here is to provide a rough, brief, but fair sketch of the
argument and its implications as a basis for the counter-argument in the next
Part. If this description is necessarily less than complete, I do not mean for it
to serve as a straw man. There is a vast, if not always satisfying, literature on
the subject, and my goal here is to situate the argument in the next Part, not
to outline all the merits or weaknesses of the illiberalism-fearing position. Its
merits and (in some writers’ hands) nuances certainly outstrip the account
offered here, and I do not want to suggest otherwise.
39 See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 1; Douglas Laycock, Sex, Atheism, and the Free Exercise of
Religion, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 407 (2011) (suggesting that “important forces in American society” have begun to challenge the principle of religious liberty); Paul Horwitz, Overheated: The Debate About Indiana’s RFRA, COMMONWEAL (Apr. 8, 2015, 3:19 PM), https://
www.commonwealmagazine.org/overheated (discussing the rising controversy over religious liberty in the context of “the antidiscrimation rights of the LGBT community”).
40 Gay Morgan, Searching for Common Ground, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 757, 757
(2002).
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Liberalism, on this simplified account, begins with the assumption of
individual autonomy and freedom of association. The liberal society is “tolerant, inclusive, and pluralistic.”41 It “neither favors nor disfavors any particular belief-system; it is neutral.”42 Not absolutely neutral, perhaps.43 But it
“presupposes that there are many reasonable . . . worldviews that are compatible with good citizenship,” and that people are entitled to hold and advocate
those worldviews.44 Inevitably, if that is the case, people will hold those
beliefs not only singly but also in groups. “[A]ssociational pluralism is inescapable so long as there is personal freedom,” and vice versa.45 These values
do not necessarily require accommodation, whether of religious or other
groups. But, for any society that treats a plurality of worldviews as natural or
inevitable, recognizes that members of such groups may contribute in various
ways to liberal society, and resists the view that the state should compel citizens to hold the same worldview, some degree of accommodation is likely to
be treated as a viable option.46
This set of propositions, and the values that undergird them—neutrality
as to the good, individual autonomy, and pluralism—gives rise to illiberalismfearing concerns. Liberal democracy depends on “reciprocity” among and
between citizens,47 and is dedicated to “the principles of equal respect and
equal dignity.”48 But many individuals and groups interpret those views differently or reject them outright. In their speech, broadcast to members and
non-members alike, they may preach “ideologies of hate.”49 In their dealings
41 Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, The Return of the Repressed: Illiberal Groups in a Liberal State,
12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 897, 898 (2002).
42 Id.
43 For one (among many) pertinent set of criticisms, see Larry Alexander, Illiberalism
All the Way Down: Illiberal Groups and Two Conceptions of Liberalism, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 625 (2002).
44 Michael W. McConnell, The New Establishmentarianism, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 453, 454
(2000).
45 ROSENBLUM, supra note 22, at 10.
46 See also Mark D. Rosen, “Illiberal” Societal Cultures, Liberalism, and American Constitutionalism, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 803, 806 (2002) (arguing, on a reading of John
Rawls and Will Kymlicka, that “liberalism may require more of an accommodation of illiberal groups than [many] commentators suggest. In fact, more than just not interfering
with such groups, foundational liberal commitments may require that the liberal State take
affirmative steps so as to give some illiberal groups the opportunity to maintain themselves
over time and to gain adherents.”).
47 Amy Gutmann, Introductory Essay, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 1, 6 (Amy Gutmann
ed., 1998).
48 Michael A. Helfand, Religious Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiating Conflicting Legal Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231, 1234 (2011); see also MAXINE EICHNER, THE
SUPPORTIVE STATE 8–9 (2010); Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental
Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2004) (describing the
development of both substantive due process and equal protection law as “a single,
unfolding tale of equal liberty and increasingly universal dignity” that “centers on a quest
for genuine self-government of groups small and large, from the most intimate to the most
impersonal”).
49 ROSENBLUM, supra note 22, at 251–53.
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with others, they may practice a policy of exclusivism in the teeth of liberal
democracy’s tendency to encourage or insist upon an “all comers” approach
to great and small interactions.50 And in their dealings with each other, they
are “internally illiberal or undemocratic, or both.”51 Women, to use a typical
(for good reason) example, may be members of a religious sect but forbidden to wield official power within it or assume positions of leadership.52
Some illiberal religious groups, moreover, are “totalistic” or comprehensive in nature: they “immerse members in the organization and take up every
moment of their lives.”53 The insular and totalistic nature of these groups
disrupts or preempts the conditions that allow liberals to tolerate, if sometimes grudgingly, the notion of membership in groups with illiberal
worldviews: their autonomy, their capacity to make voluntary choices to join
or remain in a group, and their freedom to exit that group.54 These concerns are especially great for vulnerable members of the community—vulnerable because they are children and thus unable to fully exercise autonomy, or
because, as in the case of women in some insular communities, they are
deprived of the resources or information to exit, or challenge the authority
of, the community.55
50 See SPINNER-HALEV, supra note 24, at 2–3; Inazu, supra note 15, at 612–13 (discussing, with some ambivalence, the spread of “all-comers” policies for student groups on public and private university campuses). The Court upheld such a policy in Christian Legal
Society v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010). Although the majority opinion was agnostic about
the policy apart from its reasonableness, see id. at 665 (arguing that both the Christian
Legal Society and Justice Alito, in his dissent, “confuse[d] CLS’s preferred policy with constitutional limitation” and that “the advisability of Hastings’ policy does not control its permissibility”), it is arguable that both the majority and Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion,
see id. at 702 (Stevens, J., concurring), and their choice of which doctrinal frame to use in
evaluating the case, were underwritten by a “core commitment to equal dignity and equality of opportunity.” John D. Inazu, Justice Ginsburg and Religious Liberty, 63 HASTINGS L.J.
1213, 1240–41 (2012).
51 Gutmann, supra note 47, at 22.
52 See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the Ministerial
Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965 (2007); Gila Stopler, “A
Rank Usurpation of Power”—The Role of Patriarchal Religion and Culture in the Subordination of
Women, 15 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 365 (2008); Gila Stopler, Countenancing the Oppression
of Women: How Liberals Tolerate Religious and Cultural Practices that Discriminate Against Women,
12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 154 (2003).
53 ROSENBLUM, supra note 22, at 98.
54 See, e.g., Avigail Eisenberg & Jeff Spinner-Halev, Introduction, in MINORITIES WITHIN
MINORITIES 1, 7–8 (Avigail Eisenberg & Jeff Spinner-Halev eds., 2005) (arguing that it can
be “difficult for vulnerable members [of certain cultural groups] to use the power of liberal institutions and the influence of mainstream culture to change the oppressive and
discriminatory traditions and practices of their communities”).
55 See, e.g., Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, in IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 7 (Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard & Martha C. Nussbaum
eds., 1999) (arguing that accommodation of minority cultural groups often disadvantages
women within those communities); Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against
Religious Institutionalism, 99 VA. L. REV. 917, 948 (2013) (“Insular churches pose a special
problem, for those who are most vulnerable to injury often have little means to challenge
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This is all standard fare. It is nicely summed up in a passage from a
recent book by Jacob Levy, describing what he characterizes as the “rationalist” liberal view of associations:
State authority in liberal democracies, at least in principle, is exercised in
publicly accountable, rationally-justifiable ways. Authority wielded within
other kinds of groups in a society is often quite different: resting on traditional, cultural, or religious claims about hierarchy and subordination. . . .
Insofar as intermediate groups do not treat their members as free and equal,
or teach their members not to view themselves and each other as free and
equal, or compete with rationalized state power that upholds the constitutional order, they are suspect at best, illegitimate and despotic at worst.
Intermediate groups’ discriminatory rules of admission and of eligibility for
leadership, undemocratic internal decision-making processes, substantively
repressive rules of conduct and belief, and domineering kinds of power relations all rightly offend the liberal sense of justice and the liberal belief in
each person’s standing.56

Just as the liberal valorization of autonomy and pluralism may encourage
but does not require legal accommodation of religion, so liberal concerns
about illiberalism do not foreclose accommodation, but certainly can motivate or underwrite resistance to it. One may manage one’s concerns about
illiberal groups in ways that are distinct from the question of accommodation
and that might, indeed, indirectly make accommodation more palatable for
some. Sometimes liberal fears of illiberalism are squared with the general
preference for autonomy by insisting on fairly undemanding ground-norms
that would permit members of illiberal groups to exit them.57 More commonly, a more robust form of exit right is contemplated.58 On this view, in
order for the liberal state to accept the continued existence of the illiberal
group, “citizens [must] be effectively free, not just formally free, to exit associations that are internally illiberal or undemocratic.”59
But not everyone considers exit rights, thick or thin, sufficient—or even
entirely to the point. Thus, Oonagh Reitman, arguing that exit serves an
important protective role but is unable to “help cure a group of the opprestheir authority. For example, exit rights are difficult, if not impossible, for children and
women to exercise in many insular religious communities.” (footnote omitted)); Madhavi
Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495 (2001) (arguing that “freedom of association
law authorizes the exclusion of those whose speech challenges cultural norms”).
56 LEVY, supra note 7, at 1.
57 See, e.g., CHANDRAN KUKATHAS, THE LIBERAL ARCHIPELAGO (2003) (defending, on
liberal grounds, a strong view of freedom of association accompanied by a right of exit,
even if the person possessing that right is unaware even of the possibility of exit or the
availability of a different sort of life).
58 See, e.g., Jeff Spinner-Halev, Autonomy, Association and Pluralism, in MINORITIES
WITHIN MINORITIES, supra note 54, at 157, 159–67 (proposing “a meaningful right to exit”
as part of a plan to strike a balance between cultural pluralism and individual autonomy);
Jacob T. Levy, Sexual Orientation, Exit and Refuge, in MINORITIES WITHIN MINORITIES , supra
note 54, at 172 (stressing the “importance of exit rights” for gay and lesbian members of
groups that marginalize homosexuals).
59 Gutmann, supra note 47, at 23.
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sive elements of its distinct practices by exerting pressure to bring about their
reform,” writes that “[w]hen theorists rely on exit, I sense they do so because
they misguidedly think that there are no more promising avenues to be
explored and that exit is the best mechanism on offer.”60 Similarly, Leslie
Green argues that “[i]f a certain social structure is unjust, it cannot become
just merely by becoming avoidable.”61 Exit rights are a solution to the concern about lack of individual autonomy in making group membership decisions, especially in the context of illiberal groups. But if the main concern is
the injustice of domination and subordination itself, then “[a]utonomy as
such was never the point” and the problem cannot be cured by exit rights
alone.62 The stronger one’s allegiance to this position, the more likely one is
to subscribe, sooner or later, to Rosenblum’s description of the “logic of congruence”: to insist that liberal processes, and liberal norms of dignity, equality, and nondiscrimination, must be observed all the way down.63
Illiberalism-fearing concerns that are this serious, or this encompassing
and comprehensive, can lead easily to resistance or opposition to accommodation itself. Such views are far from universal. When asked about individual
and probably targeted accommodations, at least in cases in which the injustice of the refusal to accommodate is clear and the costs seem low, many
people might well agree with such a proposal. Reasonably sophisticated
observers, acquainted with the differences between permissive and
mandatory or legislative and judicial accommodation, also would be unlikely
to count out accommodation altogether as a permissible liberal strategy.
But that is changing, at both levels of the conversation. At Slate—
roughly speaking, the center of gravity of conventional wisdom for the reasonably well-educated, non-specialist contemporary liberal—the phrase
“religious liberty” virtually no longer appears unless set off carefully by ironic
quotes. The general theme of such tropes and arguments is that religious
liberty consists only of a right against discriminatory treatment and nothing
more, and that judicial or legislative actions to the contrary are illegitimate.
At a greater level of sophistication and familiarity with the existing legal
regime and the presence of large and small religious accommodations, more
people familiar with the panoply of potential degrees of legal accommodation for religion are openly “taking a strong separatist position—no accommodation at all.”64
60 Oonagh Reitman, On Exit, in MINORITIES WITHIN MINORITIES, supra note 54, at 189,
189–90.
61 Leslie Green, Internal Minorities and Their Rights, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES 257, 266 (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995), quoted in DAVID MCCABE, MODUS VIVENDI LIBERALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE 180 (2010).
62 LEVY, supra note 7, at 30.
63 ROSENBLUM, supra note 22, at 36–41.
64 Martha Minow, Religious Exemptions, Stating Culture: Foreword to Religious Accommodations in the Age of Civil Rights, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 453, 459 (2015) [hereinafter Minow, Religious Exemptions] (quoting Dick Dahl, Religious Accommodation in the Age of Civil Rights, HARV.
L. TODAY (Apr. 30, 2014), http://today.law.harvard.edu/religious-accommodation-agecivil-rights-video/ (remarks of Mark Tushnet)). To be clear, Tushnet notes that this only
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The reasons for this change are obvious, and characteristic of what
Nancy Rosenblum has called, in a slightly different context but with continued pertinence, “the changed conditions that are at work today unsettling
democratic accommodations of religion and inspiring contemporary reflection on this enduring theme.”65 When she wrote those words, Rosenblum
had in mind three conditions: “an explosion of religious pluralism; an
increase in government activism [a]ffecting religious associations—both
coercive regulations and subsidies, benefits, and inducements; and the prominence of ‘integralism,’ or the push for a ‘religiously integrated existence.’ ”66
All are still relevant.67 More immediately, the intersection of the religious
accommodation debate with the increasing success of the movement for
LGBT rights, and the increasing political power of women—combined with
anger over laws viewed as endangering their reproductive rights and targeting their gains more generally—has raised the salience of the general question of religious accommodation, driving it from the background to the
foreground.68
Politics often simplifies and polarizes, and so it should not be surprising
in these circumstances if religious accommodation is treated as a binary
choice—either it should exist as a vigorously exercised option, or it should
not exist at all—and positions begin to harden around the poles rather than
mixing in the middle. Although this mechanism may be seen as distinct from
general illiberalism-fearing concerns about religious accommodation, it
represented the view of a few people, although he adds that he found the fact that anyone
took this position (perhaps in this particular audience) striking. Elsewhere, assessing the
“division of labor required for social change[,]” Minow suggests that some social change
advocates may “push without compromise for their desired ends” while others “play the
role of reasonable compromiser.” Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from
Civil Rights Laws?, 48 B.C. L. REV. 781, 815 n.217 (2007). For a number of reasons, including the shift in momentum on equality and civil rights for the LGBT community, variations
in the strength and intensity of that support or negative reaction to it in different political
centers, the state of political polarization and hardening of particular constituencies
around the existing political parties, and the polarizing effects of the process of adversarial
litigation, adherents on both sides of the debate may have shifted toward the uncompromising position. Those positions in turn may reflect themselves in the state of the public
and academic discussion, as priors and strategic choices are converted, consciously or not,
into arguments and convictions.
65 Nancy L. Rosenblum, Introduction, in OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP AND DEMANDS OF
FAITH 3, 4 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 2000).
66 Id. The word she uses in the sentence quoted is “effecting,” not “affecting.” One
assumes she had the latter in mind, but the former would have been relevant to many
observers at the time, when the fight over school vouchers and funding for faith-based
religious organizations was at its height. A meaningful world of difference over the accommodations debate and its surrounding politics is probably signaled by one’s conclusion
about which vowel is the correct one.
67 See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 5, at 180–84 (discussing the relevance to the Hobby
Lobby decision and the public controversy surrounding it of changing views of the marketplace and its norms, driven in part by religious integralism).
68 See id. at 172–77.
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should not be. The two are closely related. Contemporary concerns about
religious accommodation are driven largely by the substantive results feared
by opponents of particular accommodations: losses in equal dignity and
equal rights for LGBT citizens and retreats on women’s rights, reproductive
and otherwise. But those fears are driven in turn by the existence, or the
perceived existence,69 of deeply illiberal groups. From a particular liberal
perspective, these groups will not honor the rights of the members of their
own communities, will take an expansive view of the definition of those communities,70 or simply will refuse to honor any bargains at all.71
Under these circumstances—with the particular constellation of issues at
stake, and with the legal and political process and the political discussion
caught up in polarization and a frequently binary description of the available
choices—it is, again, unsurprising that concerns over illiberalism have
expressed themselves increasingly in resistance or opposition to religious
accommodation altogether.72 More important, perhaps, that polarization
has resulted in an increasing association between liberalism or political progressivism and anti-accommodationist positions. It has also left those liberals
arguing for the continued importance and justifiability of religious accommodation deprived, relatively speaking, of liberal allies and interlocutors,73
and raised the profile of those arguing for accommodation from a theological or religious traditionalist perspective—which, in turn, will doubtless fuel
more illiberalism-driven concern by liberals and a corresponding increase in
resistance to accommodation.
If accommodationists—liberal or conservative, religious or non-religious—want to make headway on the basis of something other than raw political power, they will need to find new liberal arguments for accommodation,
or retrieve neglected arguments that liberals might find attractive, thus slow69 In this respect, the fear voiced by Professor Nan Hunter of “the conversion of disagreement into demonization” is surely relevant, insofar as it suggests that the contending
sides will be more likely to view one another as “illiberal.” Minow, Religious Exemptions,
supra note 64, at 455 (describing comments by Professor Hunter at a recent conference on
religious accommodation).
70 See Horwitz, supra note 5, at 180–84.
71 See, e.g., Case, supra note 1.
72 See Kent Greenawalt, The Hobby Lobby Case: Controversial Interpretive Techniques and
Standards of Application 4 (Columbia Law Sch., Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper
No. 14-421, Oct. 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2512906 (predicting that the Hobby
Lobby decision “may well intensify resistance to religious exemptions in general”).
73 A related point may be the dominance within mainstream liberal thought of what
Levy identifies as the “rationalist” strand of liberalism, as opposed to its “pluralist” strand.
See LEVY, supra note 7, at 1–2 (describing these two strands of liberal thought and arguing
that “[t]he uneasy relationship between the two mindsets is . . . an enduring and indeed
necessary problem within liberal political thought. There is a deep, recurring tension
within liberal political thought between seeing those groups that stand between the person
and the central state as sites where free people live their diverse lives, and seeing them as
sites of local tyranny that the liberal state must be strong enough to keep in check.”); id. at
3 (arguing that pluralist liberalism “is the more neglected and unfamiliar of the two
strands”).
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ing or disrupting the momentum away from accommodationism. I turn to
one such argument now.
II. ACCOMMODATION

ILLIBERALISM-EASING, NOT ILLIBERALISMENHANCING, STRATEGY

AS AN

As the temperature and momentum of the argument over the accommodation of religion has changed, there have been some efforts to identify specifically liberal or politically progressive arguments in favor of
accommodation. One might view Douglas Laycock’s arguments—still successful in court, but arguably losing luster outside it—in this vein.74 Similarly, Robin Fretwell Wilson has argued in a series of articles, as well as in the
political arena, for compromise religious accommodation legislation that
would recognize LGBT rights against discrimination while carving out particularized religious exemptions.75 She makes the pragmatic argument that
such compromises present the best chance for state-level agreements offering
something to both parties, rather than a patchwork of results favoring one
side or the other according to the political coloration of individual states.76
In a series of recent articles, Thomas Berg has offered a broader set of
explicitly politically progressive arguments in favor of both religious accommodation and religious institutional autonomy.77 Berg, who identifies as
both a political progressive and a believer in strong religious institutional
freedom, is up-front about his concerns and his goals, warning of “a worrying
trend of more and more progressives questioning meaningful protection for
religious liberty in significant instances,” and declaring, “I believe it is vital at
this juncture to bolster the commitment among political progressives to religious liberty, even for traditionalists with whom they disagree.”78
Berg’s arguments feature a mix of pragmatism and solidaristic sentiments, both a call to common causes and a reminder of their value. The first
and least immediately pragmatic is a civil libertarian argument: “If a progressive-oriented society values free exercise as a civil liberty, as it should, then its
accommodation for faith-based service organizations in cases of conflicts of
conscience should be generous and meaningful.”79 His second is more prag74 See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 1; Laycock, supra note 39.
75 See, e.g., Robin Fretwell Wilson, Insubstantial Burdens: The Case for Government
Employee Exemptions to Same-Sex Marriage Laws, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 318 (2010).
76 See, e.g., Robin Fretwell Wilson & Anthony Michael Kreis, Embracing Compromise:
Marriage Equality and Religious Liberty in the Political Process, 15 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 485
(2014); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Bargaining for Civil Rights: Lessons from Mrs. Murphy for SameSex Marriage and LGBT Rights, 95 B.U. L. REV. 951 (2015); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Marriage
of Necessity: Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty Protections, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1161
(2014); Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Calculus of Accommodation: Contraception, Abortion, SameSex Marriage, and Other Clashes Between Religion and the State, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1417 (2012).
77 Berg, supra note 35; Berg, Progressive Arguments, supra note 18; Berg, Welfare, supra
note 6.
78 Berg, Progressive Arguments, supra note 18, at 284–85.
79 Id. at 299.
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matic, although, like his civil libertarian argument, he also appeals to common progressive values: “In pursuing progressive values of the common good
and service to the needy, we act at our peril if we threaten institutions that
are particularly effective at mobilizing people for those values.”80 Finally,
like Wilson and Laycock, with whom he has worked on legislative projects,
Berg makes the “simply pragmatic” argument that “[a]ccommodations make
it possible to enact [progressive] legislation and answer religious-liberty
objections.”81
In this Part, I offer a separate liberal argument for religious accommodation. Its goal is to respond more directly to the illiberalism-fearing concerns
that, when combined with the focus of current disputes on issues of equality
and nondiscrimination, may lead to general resistance or opposition to religious accommodation as a legal and political strategy. Whether it will prove
any more convincing than Berg’s pragmatic and solidaristic arguments is
another question. But I think it is an argument that, whatever attention it
has received at other times and in other places, has been neglected in the
current debate.
Illiberalism-centered arguments against accommodation, as we saw in
the previous Part, focus on concerns about the entrenchment of illiberal
communities, and the effect of these communities on their own members—
most notably, given actual conditions, women and children—and on general
social conditions and norms of equality. Thus, in arguing that “courts are
constitutionally required to enforce civil rights laws against all religious
groups and institutions[,]” Jane Rutherford maintains: “The problems of discrimination persist because they are deeply embedded in our common culture. Law, alone, has been unable to eradicate bias. The only hope is broad
scale change in social and cultural values. One part of that culture is a religious heritage that is pervasively discriminatory.”82 The assumption here is
that the enforcement of generally applicable laws, and particularly nondiscrimination laws, will disrupt the discriminatory culture of illiberal groups
and encourage more widely held values of legal and substantive equality.
So it might.83 There are some broad historical experiences to suggest
this, sometimes relying on legal compulsion and sometimes on general cultural shifts. As Jeff Spinner-Halev notes, “[r]eligious beliefs often turn out to
be quite malleable,” and “[s]ometimes, the right kind of incentive can work
changes in a church’s doctrine.”84 Religious groups, like other actors,
respond to incentives, including incentives to change the shape of their doctrines and practices.85 Thus, “religious doctrines or organizations, over time,
80 Id. at 308.
81 Id. at 318.
82 Rutherford, supra note 14, at 1126–28.
83 The empirics of this question are sensitively examined in two articles by Netta
Barak-Corren. See supra note 14.
84 SPINNER-HALEV, supra note 24, at 208.
85 See generally ROGER FINKE & RODNEY STARK, THE CHURCHING OF AMERICA, 1776–2005
(2005); THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF RELIGION (Rachel M. McCleary ed.,
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may adjust or diversify the package of costs and benefits they offer in order to
maintain or increase their market share.”86 One such adjustment is to lessen
the demands on current or would-be religious believers, “thus decreasing the
tension between members’ religious obligations and their secular or worldly
obligations and desires.”87 If liberal norms of equality and nondiscrimination, understood in their own terms and in relation to particular issues such
as LGBT equality, are widely held, one can expect to see—and does see—
changes in religious views on these questions, changes that will eventually
reflect themselves in religious doctrine and the views of members.88
There are grounds to think, then, that compliance—with culture, with
law—can influence or incentivize illiberal groups to liberalize over time.89
Liberals who might reject the “secularization thesis,”90 the once-common
prediction that the secularization of society would gradually tame or kill off
religion, as a normative goal might be more well-disposed toward more forceful anti-illiberal strategies, including a refusal to accommodate, if the result
were not the strangling of religion, but its liberalization.
But Spinner-Halev’s “malleability” metaphor is not quite apt, or complete. Illiberal religious groups—like other groups—harden as well as
soften, snap as well as bend, react as well as give. One response to opposition
or resistance to illiberal groups is for them to become more, not less, illiberal.
This is an intuitive, common-sense point as a general matter. There is
nothing in the general observation that should surprise liberal theorists, and
one might rest on the point itself. It may be viewed as somewhat more
counter-intuitive in this context, however. Illiberal religious practices are
costly for believers and groups, the more so the less common or welcome
they are in the broader society. But the picture is filled out by economists,
2011) [hereinafter OXFORD HANDBOOK]; Paul Horwitz, Freedom of the Church Without
Romance, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 59 (2013).
86 Horwitz, supra note 85, at 91.
87 Id. at 99 (citing RODNEY STARK & ROGER FINKE, ACTS OF FAITH 142–43, 151–54
(2000); FINKE & STARK, supra note 85, at 235–83).
88 See, e.g., ALAN WOLFE, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN RELIGION 3 (2003) (concluding that “religion in the United States is being transformed in radically new directions”); Robert P. Jones, Attitudes on Same-sex Marriage by Religious Affiliation and
Denominational Family, PUB. RELIGION RES. INST. (Apr. 22, 2015), http://publicreligion.org/
2015/04/attitudes-on-same-sex-marriage-by-religious-affiliation-and-denominational-family/#.Vs_LxFKgvdm.
89 Cf. SPINNER-HALEV, supra note 24, at 23 (“[I]t’s true and even fortunate that many
religions have changed to accommodate liberal theory.”).
90 See, e.g., LARRY WITHAM, MARKETPLACE OF THE GODS: HOW ECONOMICS EXPLAINS
RELIGION 139–59 (2010) (offering a popularized discussion of the secularization thesis
debate); STARK & FINKE, supra note 87, at 29 (defining the secularization thesis: “that in
response to moderniazation, ‘religious institutions, actions, and consciousness, [will] lose
their social significance’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)); Peter L. Berger, The
Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview, in THE DESECULARIZATION OF THE WORLD 1
(Peter L. Berger ed., 1999) (refuting the secularization thesis); Steve Bruce, Secularization
and Economic Models of Religious Behavior, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 85, at 289
(describing and defending the secularization thesis).
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sociologists, and historians of religion. On this view, religions offer credence
goods: “goods [that] require that certain types of assurances be given in
order to satisfy purchasers because the quality of the good in question cannot
be determined either before or after the sale.”91 Thus, one strategy of maintaining a religious group’s viability in the face of resistance and threats from
competitors is to engage in costly signaling of the confidence of the group
that its beliefs are true and the benefits worth the cost. That may include a
willingness, on the part of church leaders and members, to impose on themselves and endure strict rules and practices.92
More generally, as the work of Laurence Iannaccone has suggested,
religious groups, including illiberal ones, may respond to competition by
raising, rather than lowering, the cost of membership in the group.93 They
may reconfirm or reinforce the aspects of their faith that make it a “hightension” rather than “low-tension” religion.94 Aside from signaling the seriousness of the religion’s faith commitments, this also has the benefit of enabling the community to monitor and police its members’ behavior more
easily and reduce shirking.95
This story of bifurcation—of some religious groups liberalizing and
others (or subgroups within a particular faith) becoming stricter and more
illiberal, or maintaining their distinctive illiberal practices against the pressures of the broader society—is a historically accurate one as well. In their
overview of religious history and demographics in the United States, Roger
Finke and Rodney Stark observe that the liberalization of mainline American
churches may have helped maintain their de facto establishment status, but
also sapped them of energy and, in the long run, a committed membership,
and left some members abandoning them for more high-tension churches.
“The churching of America,” they write, “was accomplished by aggressive
churches committed to vivid otherworldliness.”96
91 ROBERT B. EKELUND, JR. ET AL., THE MARKETPLACE OF CHRISTIANITY 27–28 (2006); see
also Anthony Gill, Religion and Civil Liberties in the United States, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra
note 85, at 275, 281 (“[R]eligious goods at their core are credence goods, wherein it is
difficult for the consumer to know the quality of the good until some distant point in the
future.”).
92 See Horwitz, supra note 85, at 96–97.
93 See, e.g., Laurence R. Iannaccone, Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-Riding in Cults,
Communes, and Other Collectives, 100 J. POL. ECON. 271 (1992); Laurence R. Iannaccone, Why
Strict Churches Are Strong, 99 AM. J. SOC. 1180 (1994).
94 STARK & FINKE, supra note 87, at 151–54.
95 See, e.g., Rachel M. McCleary, The Economics of Religion as a Field of Inquiry, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK, supra note 85, at 3, 8–9 (discussing Iannaccone’s cost-benefit analysis of strict
religions); see also Horwitz, supra note 85, at 99–100 & n.224 (noting the consistency with
this picture of the practices of sects like the Satmar Hasidim, described in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994), and the Old Order
Amish, described in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), which make it more difficult
for members to exit a faith community or assimilate into the larger society).
96 FINKE & STARK, supra note 85, at 1.
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At least for liberals committed to some degree of respect for pluralism
and reluctance to intervene too heavily in ways that might affect the ability of
different groups to survive, this point ought to carry some weight—if not in
favor of broad accommodations, then against too ready a resistance to the
idea of accommodation. It should tell them something about why religious
groups, illiberal or otherwise, may react so strongly to the enforcement of
generally applicable laws, such as civil rights statutes, that they perceive as
affecting their distinctive practices, including leadership and staffing decisions, and tending toward the “mainstreaming” of those churches and their
practices.97 For such groups, the resistance to such laws—the insistence on
remaining “stubbornly illiberal”98—may represent not a desire to remain
“above the law,”99 but a matter of existential survival.
For those liberals driven by fear of or concern about illiberalism, that
might not be sufficient reason to reconsider accommodation. The costs to
members, and particularly vulnerable members, might understandably be
seen as exceeding the costs of enforcing generally applicable laws in a way
that alters doctrine and mainstreams those groups. The doctrine-softening
effects of generally applicable legal rules on such groups might be seen as
just in themselves, or as insufficiently distinct from the general mainstreaming effects of social change, which will occur no matter what, to counsel particular caution about enforcing generally applicable laws in the public
interest. Or one might simply make a straight utilitarian calculation that as
long as such laws result in a greater number of individuals or groups softening or abandoning their illiberalism than reaffirming or reemphasizing it,
the refusal to accommodate is justified.
Again, perhaps so. But this calculation must take into account a richer
understanding of the illiberalizing effect of refusals to accommodate and
other responses to illiberal groups, one that considers both the particular
processes such groups may undergo, and the intensity of preferences that
may be reflected in these processes.
For some illiberal groups faced with the pressure to liberalize and abandon strict illiberal practices, one response is not simply to resist through liberal political dialogue and action: voting, lobbying, litigating, speaking, and
so on. It is, rather, to cut one’s ties: to abandon participation in the liberal
sphere, to become increasingly insular rather than remaining within the
broader community as vocal dissenters.
This is one version—a controverted one, to be sure—of the asserted
“evangelical retreat” of conservative evangelical Protestants from public
involvement following the Scopes trial and the failure of the national experiment with Prohibition.100 More recently, it has figured in some proposals by
97 See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct.
694 (2012).
98 SPINNER-HALEV, supra note 24, at 23.
99 See Corbin, supra note 52.
100 For a standard account, as well as a discussion of recent revisionist accounts, see
Patrick Daniel Jackson, Lost: American Evangelicals in the Public Square, 1925–1955, at
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traditionalist Roman Catholics and evangelical Protestants in response to surrounding social changes and to changes in the public and political square.
In lighter form, it is consistent with the prediction by Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, later Pope Benedict XVI, that Catholic communities might become
“small, vital circles of really convinced believers who live their faith”
intensely.101 For some commentators, whatever Ratzinger actually meant,
this was taken as recommending that the Church become “smaller but
purer”102—a “more fervent, orthodox, evangelical church—even if it drives
people away.”103
It is far from clear that this was Ratzinger’s (and, later, Pope Benedict’s)
actual message.104 But the “smaller but purer” idea, accompanied by the
notion of retreat and insularity, has been taken positively by some conservative religious traditionalists just the same. Conservative blogger Rod Dreher,
referring to St. Benedict and not Pope Benedict XVI, has written for some
time, and “with rapidly increasing intensity,”105 about what he calls “the Benedict Option.”106
The “Benedict Option” represents an “inward turn toward communitybuilding” in which “traditionalist Christians choos[e] to step back from the
now-futile political projects and ambitions of the past four decades to cultivate and preserve a robustly Christian subculture within an increasingly hostile common culture.”107 It has grown in popularity “among social
conservative intellectuals,” partly in response to specific court rulings like
1–7 (Dec. 2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University), http://
etd.library.vanderbilt.edu/available/etd-11202012-102226/unrestricted/Jackson.pdf. See
id. at 3–4 (quoting RANDALL BALMER, BLESSED ASSURANCE: A HISTORY OF EVANGELICALISM IN
AMERICA 102 (2000) (noting that in the period between the Scopes trial and the rise of the
Moral Majority, “evangelicalism grew increasingly and intentionally separate from the
larger culture”); JOEL CARPENTER, REVIVE US AGAIN: THE REAWAKENING OF AMERICAN FUNDAMENTALISM 8, 58 (1997) (acknowledging fundamentalists formed “a sheltered community
of congregations, schools, and other religious agencies,” from within which “the surviving
fundamentalist movement would tend its own affairs, nurse its own grudges, and prophesy
God’s impending wrath”)).
101 RATZINGER, supra note 23, at 222.
102 GIBSON, supra note 23, at 13, 16. For discussion of the genealogy of that phrase,
which was not used by Ratzinger himself, see supra note 23.
103 Ian Fisher, Benedict VXI and the Church That May Shrink. Or May Not., N.Y. TIMES (May
29, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/29/weekinreview/benedict-xvi-and-thechurch-that-may-shrink-or-may-not.html (attributing the quote to an unnamed article in
The New Yorker, most likely Peter J. Boyer, A Hard Faith: How the Pope and His Predecessor
Redefined Vatican II, NEW YORKER, May 16, 2005, at 54, though the quote does not appear in
that article).
104 See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, Church, State, and the Practice of Love, 52 VILL. L. REV.
281, 284–90 (2007) (“Much of this commentary now appears to have misunderstood or
mischaracterized Cardinal Ratzinger’s points, predictions and hopes.”).
105 Damon Linker, The Benedict Option: Why the Religious Right Is Considering an All-Out
Withdrawal from Politics, WEEK (May 19, 2015), http://theweek.com/articles/555734/benedict-option-why-religious-right-considering-allout-withdrawal-from-politics.
106 Dreher, supra note 23.
107 Linker, supra note 105.
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Obergefell v. Hodges,108 but also in response to increased resistance and opposition to religious accommodation strategies.109
Similarly, Patrick Schoettmer has compared European and American
Muslim reactions to the perception of threat from the larger community and
how those perceptions affect civic and political participation and in-group
solidarity. Schoettmer finds that while the American Muslim community has
increased its political participation along with its sense of in-group solidarity,
the European Muslim community has displayed a tendency toward “political
disengagement and social isolation.”110 He warns that “if the American Muslim community loses confidence in the essential fairness and neutrality of the
U.S. government, we may be looking at the disengagement of European Muslim minorities not as a counterexample of the American case but rather as an
example of things to come.”111 In short, one response to illiberalism-fearing
moves, including a resistance or opposition to religious accommodation, may
be not a reduction in illiberalism, but an increased attachment to illiberal
practices and traditions, accompanied by a greater intensity of preference.112
Another possible response, perhaps in sequence following the move
toward retrenchment and insularity, or perhaps arising immediately and
independently under conditions of sufficient pressure, is radicalization.
“[O]nce a particular minority group or association comes to believe that its
views are beyond the pale, incapable of ever persuading the majority to take
its views seriously, militancy becomes a logical consequence.”113 Repression
of religion—the creation of religious “martyrs”—“may positively contribute

108 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
109 Linker, supra note 105 (“Over the past couple of years, but especially since the
RFRA conflagration, this idea has caught on among social conservative intellectuals . . . .”).
110 PATRICK SCHOETTMER, American Muslim Political Responses to Threat, in RELIGION AND
POLITICAL TOLERANCE IN AMERICA 228, 229 (Paul A. Djupe ed., 2015).
111 Id. at 243. One distinction between the two cases neglected by Schoettmer, but
relevant to the current discussion, may be that American Muslim engagement occurs
within a framework of (imperfect) accommodation of Muslim religious practices, rather
than a state policy of resistance or opposition to accommodation. See, e.g., Questions and
Answers for Employers: Responsibilities Concerning the Employment of Individuals Who Are, or Are
Perceived to Be, Muslim or Middle Eastern, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/
muslim_middle_eastern_employers.cfm (last visited Mar. 1, 2016); Questions and Answers for
Employees: Workplace Rights of Employees Who Are, or Are Perceived to Be, Muslim or Middle Eastern,
EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/muslim_middle_eastern_employees.cfm
(last visited Mar. 1, 2016).
112 Elsewhere, I have called this the “Ninotchka strategy,” after a line from the classic
comedy Ninotchka, in which Greta Garbo, as a Soviet apparatchik, announces that after the
most recent purges, “There are going to be fewer but better Russians.” Horwitz, supra note
85, at 100 (quoting NINOTCHKA (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios 1939)).
113 RICHARD BOYD, UNCIVIL SOCIETY 230 (2004).
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to the intensity of religious experience,”114 but in a way that “contribute[s] to
violent extremism.”115
As I have taken pains to emphasize, religious accommodation is only one
possible mechanism for liberal pluralists, and resistance or opposition to
religious accommodation is only one possible liberal response to illiberalismfearing concerns. Moreover, to the extent that the argument in this Part
relies on pragmatic cost-benefit considerations, it is subject to the conclusion
that the benefits of the resistance to accommodation, or the refusal to countenance accommodation altogether as an acceptable liberal strategy, outweigh its costs. It does fill out the picture of those costs and benefits,
however, in a way that ought to help counter what I think is the current
liberal momentum against accommodation. That is so for several reasons.
First, in a crudely consequentialist way, it suggests that accommodation
might be a better strategy for addressing illiberalism and illiberal groups and
practices than refusing to accommodate. Second, it serves as a reminder that
the picture of illiberal groups reacting in one way to the refusal to accommodate, or more generally the insistence on compliance with nondiscrimination
laws and other generally applicable laws and legal norms, is too simple.116
Even within the same broad religious community, some sectors of the community may liberalize, but other sectors of that community will become more
confirmed in their attachment to existing illiberal values and practices.
Third, such illiberal groups, confronted with suspicion or an adamant
refusal to accommodate, may not only reaffirm their illiberalism but become
more vehemently attached to it, and become more inward-looking and insular, or even violent. That intensity of preference makes the simple numbers—the head count of believers who liberalize or leave the church versus
those who become more attached to illiberal norms or practices—an insufficient guide in considering the continuing value of religious accommodation.
That is especially true if the motivation for suspicion of or opposition to
accommodation is that it will support structures of subordination that leave
some members of the community in a more vulnerable situation and less
capable of making a free and voluntary decision to exit. For those portions
114 Mathijs Pelkmans, Religious Repression and Religious Freedom: An Analysis of Their Contradictions in (Post-) Soviet Contexts, in POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 29.
115 Engy Abdelkader, The Rohinga Muslims in Myanmar: Past, Present, and Future, 15 OR.
REV. INT’L L. 393, 408 (2013) (citing PETER HENNE ET AL., RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND VIOLENT
RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM (2012), http://repository.berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/121205
RFPReligiousFreedomViolentReligiousExtremismSourcebookModernCasesAnalysis_low
%20res.pdf). For a conventional account of this mechanism, see Jennifer Earl, A Lawyer’s
Guide to the Repression Literature, 67 NAT’L LAW. GUILD REV. 3, 26–27 (2010). For a much
more complex and multi-factored account, see for example Aziz Z. Huq, The Social Production of National Security, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 637 (2013), and Aziz Z. Huq, Modeling Terrorist
Radicalization, 2 DUKE F. FOR L. & SOC. CHANGE 39 (2010). For a connection between that
issue and the Religion Clauses, see Aziz Z. Huq, Private Religious Discrimination, National
Security, and the First Amendment, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 347 (2011).
116 For an empirical examination of this question, see Barak-Corren, Empirical Evidence,
supra note 14.
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of a religious group that respond to outside pressure by becoming more insular and isolated, those members may be fewer in number but will also be
further isolated from exposure to information, resources, and meaningful
exit options. A strategy for “managing” pluralism and illiberalism that
encourages more unmanageable rump religious groups may be a suboptimal
option.
III. ON MARTYRDOM
Martyrdom is a prominent “feature of American secular as well as religious history,”117 but a decidedly, perhaps surprisingly, ambivalent one. Paeans to religious liberty evoke the Wars of Religion and its martyrs,118 tell
stylized stories about Thomas More,119 or treat conscience claims (religious
and otherwise) as raising an analogy to “a martyr obedient to an orthodox
religion.”120 Martyrdom, for some religious believers and communities,
speaks across centuries and represents the paradigmatic account of the “conflict between the will of secular government and what [they] understand as
the will of God.”121 It is not hard to tell a story about both religion clauses of
the First Amendment as the legal expression of a recognition of the pains of
martyrdom and the desire to disable government from imposing it.122
Those are the romantic traces of a resistance to deliberate governmentimposed martyrdom. Beyond that general narrative, however, legal actors
117 Larry Catá Backer, Religion as the Language of Discourse of Same Sex Marriage, 30 CAP.
U. L. REV. 221, 253 n.150 (2002).
118 See, e.g., STEVEN D. SMITH, THE DISENCHANTMENT OF SECULAR DISCOURSE 121–27
(2010); Oliver B. Pollak, “Be Just Before You’re Generous”: Tithing and Charitable Contributions
in Bankruptcy, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 527, 532 (1996) (“The First Amendment’s concern for
free exercise of religion and prohibitions on the establishment of religion arise out of
colonists’ memories, experiences, and martyrology in England.”).
119 See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, Standing, Spending, and Separation: How the No-Establishment Rule Does (and Does Not) Protect Conscience, 54 VILL. L. REV. 655, 657–58 (2009); Michael
W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 16–17 (2000).
120 United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902, 905 (D. Mass. 1969); see J. Morris Clark,
Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REV. 327, 341–42 (1969).
121 Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 27 (1983)
(quoting Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari on Behalf of
Church of God in Christ, Mennonite at 4, Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574
(1983) (No. 81-3)); see id. (“The purpose of the first amendment free exercise clause for
members of this church is constituted, in part, by a live sense of the crisis of obligation
posed by their religious beliefs.”); id. at 28 (“The Mennonite narratives, whether the quasisacred tales of martyrs or the more recent stories of conscientious objectors, help to create
the identity of the believer and to establish the central commitment from which any law—
and especially any organic law—of the state will be addressed.” (footnotes omitted)).
122 See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 9–11 (1947) (relating a history of European and colonial practices of persecution and punishment for religious beliefs that
“shock[ed] the freedom-loving colonials into a feeling of abhorrence,” feelings which,
along with “indignation” at the “imposition of taxes to pay ministers’ salaries and to build
and maintain churches and church property[,] . . . found expression in the First
Amendment”).
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are much less interested in or troubled by martyrdom, at least if it is understood as involving unwise individual choices or the private imposition of martyrdom on the vulnerable. Far more frequently quoted by courts and
scholars than any rhapsodies about Thomas More is Justice Rutledge’s conclusion in Prince v. Massachusetts: “Parents may be free to become martyrs
themselves. But it does not follow that they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have reached the age
of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for
themselves.”123
Martyrdom is a limit case, presenting the highest conflicts between the
most serious religious obligations and the most punishing secular consequences. Most religious accommodations involve less dramatic burdens on
religion and less severe consequences. But martyrdom still lurks behind the
general notion of accommodation: to “enable a person to practice his faith,
usually by removing social or governmental obstacles.”124 And asking
whether the government should care about religious martyrdom in the first
place, or indeed is disabled from caring about it, raises interesting questions
about the very idea of religious accommodation and its role in the constitutional system.
Some of these questions are explored in a 1999 article by Mark Tushnet,
tentatively and perhaps puckishly titled In Praise of Martyrdom?125 Too rarely
cited,126 Tushnet’s article makes some of the most interesting arguments
against religious accommodation. Although most of Tushnet’s arguments
elsewhere against religious accommodation are phrased in more secular and
doctrinal terms, traces of the earlier article are evident in one of his more
recent treatments of the subject of religious accommodation.127
It is worth describing his argument and asking how it fits with the liberal
argument for accommodation made in this Article. For a mix of theological
and secular liberal reasons, I conclude that Tushnet’s objections are insufficient to derail this argument for religious accommodation, although I also
believe Tushnet rightly and importantly reveals the deeper stakes and tensions that the question of accommodation raises, and makes clear that the
relationship between religion and liberal democracy is and should remain a
troubled one.128
123 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
124 Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 35.
125 Tushnet, Martyrdom, supra note 21.
126 The most relevant citation to the article is in a recent paper by Louis Michael Seidman, Political and Constitutional Obligation, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1257, 1269–70 (2013) (arguing
that “the best way to manifest respect” for “alternative sources of normative authority . . .
may be by punishing violators,” and arguing that this “points away from rather than toward
a system of exemptions”).
127 See Tushnet, Thirty Years On, supra note 21, at 24–29.
128 See PAUL HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE: LAW, RELIGION, AND THE CONSTITUTION
303–04 (2011).
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Tushnet’s Martyrdom article is written as a brief response to a lecture by
Professor Stephen Carter.129 In his lecture, Carter, reflecting on churchstate law before and after RFRA, expresses his doubts that RFRA or any positive law “could provide the solution” to what he calls “the challenge facing
religions under the American constitutional regime.”130 The problem with
any such solution, he suggests, is that “religion itself, particularly deeply committed religious faith, with all the discipline that the term implies, is simply
not a force that law can afford to unleash.”131 Later he writes, “[O]ur theories of religious freedom are not theories about religion; they are theories
about the state and its needs.”132
Tushnet begins by “welcom[ing] Professor Carter to the (unfortunately
thin) ranks of skeptics about the entire project of defending the propriety of
accommodations of religion,”133 a sentence worth quoting in this context
because, as I have suggested, the ranks of accommodation skeptics seem bigger now, a mere seventeen years later.134 Rather than advancing a doctrinal
secular argument against accommodation, as he has done elsewhere,135
Tushnet takes Carter’s opening to offer “what I take to be the theological
case against accommodation.”136
That case involves two concerns. The first is “[t]he concern that accommodations are bad for religion.”137 This concern itself takes two forms. The
first is that, since accommodations inevitably will come up against limits, “a
religion that has grown accustomed to having its concerns accommodated
may be particularly disappointed when it presses its concerns beyond the limits the State is willing to recognize.”138 This Tushnet finds insufficient,139
albeit with some important and interesting reservations.140 Better half of five
(or seven) loaves than none at all, so to speak.141
The second objection is broader and depends on “something ontological, an aspect of religion as such and independent of any social arrangement.”142 On this view, “the State is just irrelevant to religion.”143 The two
129 Stephen L. Carter, Religious Freedom as if Religion Matters: A Tribute to Justice Brennan,
87 CALIF. L. REV. 1059 (1999).
130 Id. at 1060.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 1072.
133 Tushnet, Martyrdom, supra note 21, at 1117.
134 Whether the thinning or thickening of the ranks is likely to be a continuous process
or a cyclical one is a separate question.
135 See supra note 21.
136 Tushnet, Martyrdom, supra note 21, at 1117.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 1118.
139 See id.
140 See id. at 1118–19.
141 See Matthew 14:13–21, 15:32–16:10; Mark 6:31–44, 8:1–9; Luke 9:10–17; John 6:5–15
(King James) (providing Gospel accounts of the feeding of 5000 people with five loaves
and two fish and a later miracle involving the feeding of a multitude with seven loaves and
a few small fish).
142 Tushnet, Martyrdom, supra note 21, at 1120.
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operate in, and concern themselves with, two different domains. The state
can act on religious believers—it can fine them, jail them, or burn them—but
it cannot alter religious belief itself: “A person who truly believes cannot—
simply cannot—be induced to change his or her beliefs.”144
More than being simply distinct from religion and its domain, “[t]he
State is hostile or unfriendly to religion in its very essence because religion and
the State deal with two entirely separate domains.”145 And for the religious
believer, “seeking an accommodation moves [her] in the wrong direction,
into the State’s domain.”146 It places religion in the position of supplicant.
Tushnet makes clear that he is not celebrating either religious oppression or
religious martyrdom as such. But “I do not expect oppression to disappear
either, and so do not expect martyrdom to disappear. Accommodations of
religion make it easy to overlook the fact that oppression is a brute fact about
the pre-millennial world.”147 Better to reject accommodations, even when
they are freely offered, and make that brute fact palpable, than to postpone
the inevitable or blind oneself to the fact of the state’s oppression of others.
This is a striking and powerful objection to religious accommodation,
for several reasons. It honors religion’s subversive and oppositional power
rather than treating it as insignificant or indistinct. As Carter’s article does,
this objection recognizes the danger involved in coming to the state with
one’s hand out and asking for a political or judicial ruling favoring an accommodation: doing so cedes to the state ground that, on this view, does not
belong to it—and that, once ceded, may be lost for good. And Tushnet’s
objection recognizes the power of martyrdom, in the very act of questioning
whether it is appropriate to forestall it at the cost of recognizing the state’s
authority within the religious domain. It does not quite tell us whether it is
inappropriate as such for the state to offer accommodations, although
another suite of arguments may address that question.148 But it does suggest
that if liberals reject accommodation for secular reasons, religious objectors
will be left without standing to object, so to speak, and should accept, if not
welcome, the confrontation.
I am moved but not finally persuaded by this account. It tells a story
about religion and about martyrdom, but not the only story. For one thing,
from a perfectly common religious perspective, there are other goods to be
achieved in this world besides the immediate and ultimate transformation of
authority. These goods may be imbricated with religious meaning and purpose, but they are achieved in the physical world and undertaken pragmati143 Id.
144 Id. at 1119.
145 Id. at 1121 (emphasis added).
146 Id.; see also Tushnet, Thirty Years On, supra note 21, at 29 (recalling a statement by
the Mennonite theologian John Howard Yoder: “It’s not the Christian’s role to tell Satan
how to do his job”). Tushnet adds: “Satan is no less a deluder when he offers religious
accommodations.” Id.
147 Tushnet, Martyrdom, supra note 21, at 1121.
148 See, e.g., Tushnet, Thirty Years On, supra note 21, at 13–22.
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cally—subject, to be sure, to the ultimate limits of conviction.149 Religious
individuals or groups may wish to feed the poor. They may believe, indeed,
that it is everyone’s duty to feed the poor. They may give all that they have to
accomplish this, ask or demand more from others, and haggle over the price
of the goods needed to do so. But most such groups do not believe they
should walk into a supermarket and commandeer the goods on the shelf to
achieve that goal, and they know their goal will be impeded if they do. Not
every religious act is a confrontation; many such acts are negotiations, and
are understood by the religious, and from within religion, as such.
I also believe Tushnet’s account of religious belief and its relationship
with the world, including the domain of the State, is too narrow, or based too
much on a theology that assumes God is done speaking. This view is implicit
in the statement that “[a] person who truly believes cannot—simply cannot—be induced to change his or her beliefs.”150 Tushnet adds in a footnote
that of course “truly held religious beliefs” can change, but they “can change
[only] through the methods that each religion acknowledges as a basis for
belief (revelation or reasoning, for example),” not “by the operation of [secular] incentives.” Some religions may, he supposes, “allow for religious
change in response to external incentives.” But he doubts whether many
religious believers “would acknowledge that their religious beliefs are of this
sort.”151
The footnote to the statement, I think, comes closer to the truth, for
some or perhaps many religionists, than the statement itself. It is true that
religions—especially those that rely in substantial measure on ancient texts,
as the Mosaic faiths do—can have complex relations with the phenomenon
of changes in religious belief.152 But where reasoning is available as a
method of assessing religious obligation and its limits in particular circumstances, it will necessarily consider the facts of those circumstances as well as
the religious principles that apply to it. A religious group in such an instance
is not necessarily changing its beliefs in response to external incentives, but it
can certainly refine or alter its understanding of what the principles demand
in the circumstances. It may ask—as some groups did in the recent negotiations with the government over the scope of religious accommodations
within the contraceptive mandate regulations—what it can or cannot do by
way of compliance with the law.153 These kinds of negotiations are particu149 See generally Berg, Progressive Arguments, supra note 18.
150 Tushnet, Martyrdom, supra note 21, at 1119.
151 Id. at 1119 n.16.
152 For one such perspective, see generally JOHN T. NOONAN JR., A CHURCH THAT CAN
AND CANNOT CHANGE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF CATHOLIC MORAL TEACHING (2005).
153 See, e.g., Heather Sawyer, The Role of Congress in Advancing Civil Rights: Lessons from
Two Movements, 29 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 165, 173 & n.26 (2015) (listing groups that were
substantially or partially satisfied by the administration’s final rule); Michael Sean Winters,
Catholic Health Association Says It Can Live with HHS Mandate, NAT’L CATHOLIC REP. (July 9,
2013), http://ncronline.org/blogs/distinctly-catholic/breaking-cha-can-live-hhs-mandate
(noting the Catholic Health Association’s acceptance of the final rule implementing the
contraception mandate).
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larly likely—and pertinent, if, as is the case for many of the groups currently
involved in public controversies over religious accommodation, a group’s
religious beliefs include the view that one should try to comply with the law as
well as a belief that one cannot always do so.
Things are still more complicated where a religious group believes itself
still to be in the grip of ongoing religious revelation, and in which the living
and speaking God is, so to speak, watching the news every day and negotiating His rules for His flock accordingly. In American history, the paradigmatic example involves the conflict between the United States government
and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, the Mormon church,
over plural marriage.154 When the conflict was at its height, and “it had
become clear that the Mormons would lose this confrontation,” Wilford
Woodruff, the “president and prophet of the Mormon church, issued a declaration which Mormons know as the Manifesto.”155
The short version, of course, is that the church abandoned the practice
of plural marriage. But the reasons Woodruff gave were striking, not least for
being both “religious” and “secular.” God, Woodruff said, had put a question
to the faith: whether it was wiser to insist on the divinely ordained practice of
plural marriage, at the cost of immense damage to the church, its leaders,
and its mission, or, “after doing and suffering what we have through our
adherence to this principle[,] to cease the practice and submit to the law.”156
He added:
I saw [through revelation] exactly what would come to pass if there was not
something done. I have had this spirit upon me for a long time. But I want
to say this: I should have let all the temples go out of our hands; I should
have gone to prison myself, and let every other man go there, had not the
God of heaven commanded me to do what I did do; and when the hour
came that I was commanded to do that, it was all clear to me. I went before
the Lord, and I wrote what the Lord told me to write.157

As Tushnet comments, “[e]xternal observers sometimes take the cynical
view that [such] changes are insincere capitulations to external pressure.”158
From an internal perspective, however, the decision was sincere and rooted

154 See generally SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2002).
155 Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Integrity of Survival: A Mormon Response to Stanley
Hauerwas, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 167, 169 (1992). The Manifesto is collected with excerpts
from three subsequent addresses by Woodruff and referred to collectively as “Official Declaration 1” in the “Doctrine and Covenants” of the church. See Official Declaration 1, THE
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, https://www.lds.org/scriptures/dc-testament/od/1. (last visited Mar. 2, 2016).
156 Official Declaration 1, THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, https://
www.lds.org/scriptures/dc-testament/od/1 (last visited Mar. 2, 2016).
157 Id.
158 Tushnet, Thirty Years On, supra note 21, at 25 n.125.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-4\NDL402.txt

1332

unknown

Seq: 32

notre dame law review

16-MAY-16

14:31

[vol. 91:4

within a continuing revelation about one’s religious beliefs and their implications.159 In a thoughtful discussion, Frederick Mark Gedicks puts it this way:
Just as Wilford Woodruff had made it clear that the survival of the Mormon
church depended on its abandoning plural marriage, he had also made it
clear that this abandonment was the will of God. He maintained that he had
received direct revelation that God no longer required the church to practice polygamy. In my religion, God does not always demand faithfulness
over survival.
....
. . . [I]t does not seem to me that [Woodruff] erred in compromising to
preserve the church. Mormons understand their church to exist in the
world to do God’s work, and the church clearly cannot do God’s work unless
it exists in the world. For Mormons, then, there is religious integrity even in
compromise and survival.160

This puts a very different gloss on the theological question of martyrdom
and the accommodation of religion, which Gedicks calls “one of the most
serious crises of religious conscience: the choice between faithfulness and
survival.”161 It suggests that, for some and perhaps many faiths, negotiating
or pleading within the state’s “domain” is a matter of religious obligation and
can be undertaken and understood within that domain. The multiple religious works and values prized by a religious believer or group may require
indifference to the state’s laws, up to and including martyrdom. But they
159 For useful discussions of this episode from both internal and external perspectives,
see for example GORDON, supra note 154, Robert J. Morris, Both “New” and “Everlasting:”
Law and Religion in the Creation of Neo-Mormon Doctrine on (Homo)sexuality, 6 RUTGERS J.L. &
RELIGION 8 (2004), and Elizabeth Harmer-Dionne, Note, Once a Peculiar People: Cognitive
Dissonance and the Suppression of Mormon Polygamy as a Case Study Negating the Belief-Action
Distinction, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1295 (1998).
160 Gedicks, supra note 155, at 171–72. Gedicks’s article, like Tushnet’s article on martyrdom, deserves greater attention from law and religion scholars, and each is more powerful when read alongside the other. In my law and religion class, I provide students with
both, as well as the text of Woodruff’s revelation, in teaching Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145 (1878), which rejected a First Amendment argument for an exemption from a
federal law prohibiting polygamy. Beyond the gloss they provide on the “belief-conduct”
distinction employed by the Court in Reynolds and returned to, in substantial part, in its
epochal decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), these materials lead
students to think productively about the complex relationship between church and state in
the formation and alteration of religious belief, and about the extent to which the American church-state legal regime is built on centuries of historically specific and contingent
conflicts and compromises between specifically Christian sects and specifically Western
states. That, in turn, influences students’ understanding of cases like Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988), which held that no claim for a First
Amendment “burden” on religion lies where the government builds a road on its own land
“in ways that [do not] comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens,” id. at 448
(quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699–700 (1986)), even if doing so will “virtually
destroy” the claimants’ “ability to practice their religion,” id. at 464 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688, 692
(1986)).
161 Gedicks, supra note 155, at 171.
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may also allow or require “do[ing] all [they] can to stave off the end.”162
That can include arguing for accommodation.
Even outside the framework of ongoing revelation and within the core
tradition of martyrdom, seeking or accepting accommodation can be seen as
a theologically acceptable move. God made minds as well as martyrs. As
Robert Bolt puts it in his dramatization of St. Thomas More’s martyrdom,
God “made [man] to serve him wittily, in the tangle of his mind.”163 Even
someone who accepts the value of martyrdom and the precedence of religious obligations to any command of the state may, as More did, employ his
wit to survive insofar as that is compatible with those higher obligations.164
As with the Mormon example, sometimes that “may” is a “must,” where one
has a religious obligation to stay alive, out of respect for life or the duty to do
other good works.165
I have given substantial space to these questions, despite their distance
from a liberal argument for religious accommodation, because I think
Tushnet raises important questions about the relationship between law and
martyrdom, and between martyrdom and accommodation, and because his
discussion of this subject is, in my opinion, the most intellectually interesting
and demanding criticism of accommodation. In the end, however, I think
the answer to the argument he presents is easy, albeit incomplete.
Tushnet’s theological argument is compelling because, by giving a
heroic account of the “domain of religion” and its ultimate indifference to the
state and its use of violence, it presents a stark vision of the potential confrontation between the two. But it is not the only vision of what religious belief
entails or how it is carried out in this world. One can accept the ultimate
possibility or necessity of martyrdom without craving it devoutly. As long as
that is the case, it is possible to imagine working with the state to avoid its
occasions—including by seeking a space for accommodation. Exactly when
this will involve a move “in the wrong direction, into the State’s domain,”166
remains a difficult and pressing question for religious believers.167 And so
Tushnet’s argument continues to have bite. But it does not preclude the
possibility of a plausible theological argument for accommodation.168
162 Id.
163 ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS 126 (Random House 1990) (1960).
164 See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Interrogating Thomas More: The Conundrums of Conscience, 1
U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 580, 589 (2003).
165 See id. at 589 n.40 (“It is possible, . . . as [Richard] Marius speculates, that More
might have desired death but also believed it was his duty to maintain his life—to ‘stay at
his post,’ so to speak—as long as he could without violating other higher duties.” (citing
RICHARD MARIUS, THOMAS MORE 499 (1984))).
166 Tushnet, Martyrdom, supra note 21, at 1121.
167 See, e.g., Carter, supra note 129; Gedicks, supra note 155, at 172–73 (asking whether
the Mormon Church is “better off [today] than it would have been had it chosen faithfulness over survival” and conceding, “I do not even know how to think about th[at]
question”).
168 Notwithstanding his general worries about the relationship between religion and
liberalism, Carter appears to agree (perhaps inconsistently). See Stephen L. Carter, Must
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That a theological case for accommodation may remain despite Tushnet’s
argument does not directly affect the availability of a liberal argument for
accommodation. But it can be important to that argument nonetheless. For
one thing, it gives “standing” back to religious advocates for accommodation,
allowing them to argue appropriately for accommodations, rather than
restricting them to the role of accepting accommodations (maybe) when
they are offered by a generous state, but not arguing for them.
For another, the story told in this Part—of religious individuals and
groups acting “neither [as] unearthly saint[s] nor despicable sinner[s]” but
as possessors of piety and wit,169 seeking sufficient room to comply with the
law and their religious obligations, and thus remaining in dialogue with the
liberal state—adds flesh to the argument made in Part II. It does not make
religious accommodation mandatory or necessary for liberals, but it does
leave the possibility of accommodation available, even advisable. It suggests
that there are liberal gains to be made by accommodation, by maintaining
lines of contact and communication even between the liberal state and illiberal groups. And it suggests by implication that absent that prospect, the
result instead will be one of greater illiberalism and less communication, of
retrenchment, retreat, and insularity—or, perhaps, of martyrdom or violence. That is a prospect that liberals justifiably and consistently may wish
devoutly to avoid.
IV. IMPLICATIONS

FOR

ACCOMMODATION CASES

AND

CONTROVERSIES

The goal of this Article has been to offer a reason for liberals not to back
off the religious accommodation project altogether. I have avoided intervening in the current besetting legal questions—which are, to be sure, many,
serious, and difficult—over its administration. But there are one or two
related points about the law of religious accommodations, and about the
spirit in which it is undertaken, that I think follow from or are consistent with
the argument.
There is some danger in doing so, if only the danger of falling into
cliché. No matter the theoretical abstraction of the main argument or its
“plea for difficulty” in addressing an issue,170 it is all too customary for legal
scholarship to labor to turn a mountain into a mouse. Even broad discusLiberalism Be Violent? A Reflection on the Work of Stanley Hauerwas, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
201, 215–18 (2012) (arguing, from what seems both a theological and a political perspective, that there is room for those who wish to live out a life of Christian witness to seek to
“reduce rather than expand the reach of the violence that undergirds the state,” and that
this can include “a robust principle of accommodation [that] would help protect and nurture communities of difference”).
169 H. Jefferson Powell, Who’s Afraid of Thomas Cromwell?, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 393, 394
(1999).
170 Megan Pearson, Religious Claims vs. Non-Discrimination Rights: Another Plea for Difficulty, 15 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 47 (2013) (drawing for inspiration on Martha C. Nussbaum, A Plea for Difficulty, in IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN?, supra note 55, at
155).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-4\NDL402.txt

2016]

unknown

against martyrdom

Seq: 35

16-MAY-16

14:31

1335

sions of the impossibility of meaningful resolution are strained into narrow
“prayer[s] for relief.”171 Legal scholarship routinely transforms real tragedy
into less-than-convincing comedy.172
It bears emphasis, then, that less turns on the specific recommendations
made here than on the broader point that there are continuing reasons for
liberals not to turn in principle against religious accommodation altogether.
The most important aspect of the recommendations in this Part, and the one
that is most closely connected to the arguments made in Part II, is not what it
says about the mechanics of implementing religious accommodation, but
what it says about the spirit in which that implementation is conducted, especially by judges.
The first suggestion concerns so-called “targeted” or “specific” accommodations of religion: accommodations designed and tailored to alleviate a
specific burden on religion, as opposed to a general statutory or constitutional right of accommodation for religious burdens, to be applied on a caseby-case basis.173 Targeted accommodations, granted through the political
process in response to specific concerns, are acceptable even to many who
are broadly skeptical about religious accommodations.174 That position may
be ambivalently held. Those who question whether accommodation of religion “can . . . serve as a master concept for the field”175 may recommend
sharply limiting the likely availability of permissible targeted accommodations,176 or acknowledge the continuing problems, from their perspective, of
even targeted accommodations.177 Nevertheless, even these accommodation
skeptics may conclude that the difficulties posed by targeted accommodations are not as great as those posed by general accommodations.
171 Pierre Schlag, Spam Jurisprudence, Air Law, and the Rank Anxiety of Nothing Happening
(A Report on the State of the Art), 97 GEO. L.J. 803, 813 (2009); see also Shari Motro, Scholarship
Against Desire, 27 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 115, 116, 123 (2015).
172 For reflections on the inevitability of tragedy and tragic choices in religious freedom, see generally MARC O. DEGIROLAMI, THE TRAGEDY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2013); see
also HORWITZ, supra note 128, at xxv; Paul Horwitz, Permeable Sovereignty and Religious Liberty,
49 TULSA L. REV. 235, 238, 238 n.25 (2013).
173 See Tushnet, Thirty Years On, supra note 21, at 14–15; Robin Fretwell Wilson, When
Governments Insulate Dissenters from Social Change: What Hobby Lobby and Abortion Conscience
Clauses Teach About Specific Exemptions, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 703 (2014).
174 See, e.g., IRA C. LUPU & ROBERT W. TUTTLE, SECULAR GOVERNMENT, RELIGIOUS PEOPLE 216–19 (2014); Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 35, 101 (2015) [hereinafter Lupu, Dubious Enterprise].
175 Tushnet, Thirty Years On, supra note 21, at 32.
176 See, e.g., Lupu, Dubious Enterprise, supra note 174, at 101 (“In those few circumstances in which religion-specific accommodations are appropriate, legislators and administrators are free to act, subject to Establishment Clause concerns.”).
177 See Tushnet, Thirty Years On, supra note 21, at 32 n.154; Lupu, Dubious Enterprise,
supra note 174, at 101 (noting critics’ suggestion that if “the enterprise of judicial exemptions under general regimes like RFRA, or pre-Smith free exercise norms, is so dubious,”
that ought to raise questions about “why [targeted] legislative and administrative accommodations should be acceptable”).
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From the perspective of the specific, pragmatic, liberal argument offered
in this Article—that concerns about illiberalism are sometimes better
addressed by accommodating illiberal groups than by refusing accommodation altogether and thus risking a reaction of greater illiberalism—targeted
accommodations ought to be both acceptable and, in many cases, attractive.
Not only are the costs of such accommodations lower, but they often
represent substantive judgments in line with general liberal approval of individual autonomy, diversity, and pluralism.
The targeted legislative accommodation that followed the Supreme
Court’s decision in Goldman v. Weinberger178 provides an example. Whatever
value uniformity has in the armed forces, and whatever value universal compliance with rules has in general, those rules can be “tailored” to acknowledge existing practices of great importance to religious individuals and
groups without doing undue damage to those general values.179 The legislative accommodation in this case represented a reasonable policy judgment
arrived at through the democratic political process. It facilitated military service by religious individuals, and preserved the military’s interest in uniformity and esprit de corps and its ability to deal with special circumstances, by
permitting members of the armed forces to wear “neat and conservative”
religious clothing when it does not interfere with their duties.180 From the
illiberalism-fearing perspective, it kept members of religious groups as participants within the institutions of the liberal state rather than setting them
against it. Like all accommodations, it did not do so completely or without
raising larger questions, such as how to determine what constitutes “neat and
conservative” appearance. But it was a plausible liberal resolution.
General religious accommodations raise more difficult questions, of
course. By general religious accommodations, I mean here either statutes or
constitutional regimes, like the one that ostensibly prevailed between Sherbert
v. Verner181 and Employment Division v. Smith,182 that mandate accommodation for religious believers whose religious practices are burdened by even a
generally applicable law. My primary focus is on judges administering such a
regime, whether statutory or constitutional, in particular cases.
The central point here is one made sometimes in the context of the
Religion Clauses, and often in general discussions of judicial review: how
courts speak to litigants, and the broader social, political, and cultural con178 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
179 That is especially true if the “uniform” rules themselves either already incorporate
majority cultural norms—pants rather than kilts, say—or are applied unevenly in a way that
reflects majority values and fails to acknowledge the importance of minority practices. For
a discussion of the latter in the context of the Goldman case, see Samuel J. Levine, Untold
Stories of Goldman v. Weinberger: Religious Freedom Confronts Military Uniformity, 66 AIR
FORCE L. REV. 205 (2010).
180 10 U.S.C. § 774(b)(2) (2012).
181 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
182 494 U.S. 872 (1990).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-4\NDL402.txt

2016]

unknown

against martyrdom

Seq: 37

16-MAY-16

14:31

1337

troversies they represent, can matter.183 As Eric Berger writes, decisions rendered with
absolutist rhetoric signal[ ] that a given case’s losers are not just wrong, but
fundamentally misguided about the country’s core principles. Losing litigants, then, are cast as outsiders, alienating them and encouraging them to
retort with their own incendiary constitutional rhetoric.184

In so doing, such decisions may “inflict harms on constitutional losers
that exceed the harm inherent in losing a substantive constitutional
argument.”185
One may reasonably question how much the language of judicial opinions matters to non-lawyers, even to the litigants themselves, compared to the
outcome.186 Insofar as liberal theorists agree that “the meaning of losing, and
its significance for our experience of autonomy, are profoundly affected by
how we talk to each other in our deliberations[,]”187 liberals considering the
argument for accommodation in this Article may be willing to go along with
it regardless of the answer to that question.188 But we can, I think, add safely
that whatever the general answer is, there is good reason to think it is important here and now, in religious accommodation cases, given the visibility and
salience of these issues and the fact that these debates are taking place simultaneously in both the judicial and the political domains.
To the extent that one shares the premise that courts and other legal
decisionmakers should avoid alienating legal and political losers, as opposed
to simply deciding against them, that premise is especially relevant to the
argument that the general rejection of religious accommodation may fuel
illiberalism rather than ease it.189 These are not obscure, low-visibility cases.
They are actively under dispute in current public discussion and political
deliberation, and decisions like Hobby Lobby are more visible than even most
high-profile Supreme Court decisions. And these disputes and decisions are
indeed actively encouraging discussion over whether religious accommodation is appropriate at all, and provoking deliberation within some religious
communities about the prospects of insularity or resistance. Thus, even if
183 For an excellent bibliographical essay collecting and discussing relevant sources, see
EMILY M. CALHOUN, LOSING TWICE: HARMS OF INDIFFERENCE IN THE SUPREME COURT 117–23
(2011). Another strong discussion published since Calhoun’s book is Eric Berger, The
Rhetoric of Constitutional Absolutism, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 667 (2015). This discussion
draws on both those sources and on ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT
(1992).
184 Berger, supra note 183, at 675.
185 CALHOUN, supra note 183, at 4.
186 Relevant sources on this question are noted and discussed briefly in Calhoun’s
book, id. at 122–23.
187 Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 153 (2007)
(emphasis omitted).
188 See, e.g., Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, The Moral Foundations of Truth Commissions, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 22, 35–36 (Robert I.
Rotberg & Dennis Thompson eds., 2000).
189 For similar arguments, see SWAINE, supra note 8, at 12–28.
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one assumes that accommodation is not always appropriate, how and when
one decides that it is not appropriate can matter for the liberal project.190
In the specific context of religious accommodations cases in American
courts, I think that means courts should favor balancing over categorical
approaches,191 even—perhaps especially—in cases where the religious claimant loses.192 Government often has excellent, public-regarding reasons to
limit religious accommodation, reasons available and plausible to many who
also hold strong religious views or disagree with the ultimate balance of public goods. It is better to decide against accommodation on that basis than to
reject such a claim at the outset on the categorical grounds that there is no
“burden” on the believer’s religion, which may well be understood—perhaps
rightly—as a statement of contempt or disbelief rather than a mere managerial technique.
Losing on balancing rather than categorical grounds will not answer the
intractable question how we should balance religious and secular obligations.
Nor will it remove the religious believer or community’s ultimate need to
choose between compliance and martyrdom.193 But it may affect the illiberal
religious group’s response to the judgment. It may make the difference
between its decision whether to remain within the broader liberal society,
perhaps liberalizing its views and practices or perhaps maintaining its position as a dissentient group, but one situated within the liberal circle194—or to
retreat, to become more illiberal, and to cut off productive ties of commerce,
communion, and conversation.
One example—neither the hardest nor the easiest—will serve here.195
Many members of the Sikh faith believe male members of the community
should wear a ceremonial dagger known as a kirpan at all times. That practice conflicts with school no-weapons policies and school administrators have
sometimes banned Sikh boys from carrying kirpans at school. In such a case,
and particularly absent a regime favoring religious accommodation, adminis190 See, e.g., id. at 28; McConnell, supra note 44, at 457.
191 I reserve here the question whether that balancing should take place under something like the existing statutory regime of RFRA or the pre-Smith regime, which (at least
ostensibly in the latter case) requires strict scrutiny, or—as Robert Burt’s argument suggests—should instead favor a more evenly weighted balancing approach, such as intermediate scrutiny. See BURT, supra note 183, at 362–68. Although I think there is much that is
attractive about such an approach, I also think one value of strict scrutiny is that in particular kinds of disputes, it may encourage government to invest in accommodations mechanisms that serve both the needs of the religious objector and the strong interests of the
public beneficiaries of the policy.
192 Cf. Horwitz, supra note 5, at 157 n.16 (arguing briefly that “I would not have been
terribly distressed if the plaintiffs had lost in Hobby Lobby, provided that they had lost at the
interest-balancing stage rather than having their claims denied on categorical grounds”).
193 In fairness, most conflicts do not present that dilemma in anything like so urgent
and unavoidable a sense.
194 Cf. Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, “He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out”: Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. REV. 581 (1993).
195 I draw here on HORWITZ, supra note 128, at 205–08.
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trators, legislators, and judges can point to ostensibly strong reasons for such
policies and for the refusal to accommodate the Sikh practice: safety, security, and uniformity.196 We regularly recognize and enforce such interests.
An accommodation-skeptical liberal might conclude—and say to the community of believers—that “[o]nly a flawed legal doctrine would lead a court [or
some other decision-maker] out on such a weak limb” as to accommodate the
kirpan. “Knives are knives, and children are not safe in their presence, no
matter who they are.”197
Courts and schools have found various ways of accommodating the wearing of kirpans, sometimes by requiring that they be blunted, or that they be
sewed into their sheaths.198 The point here is not that this is the right decision, although I certainly think it is. It is that an approach that rejects or is
highly suspicious of accommodation as such would not have the occasion to
reach it, or would hand the claimants a defeat in particularly stinging terms
that would encourage separatism and illiberalism rather than dialogue. It
would lose the opportunity for the religious community and the state “to
reconcile their positions and find common ground tailored to their own
needs.”199
In arguing that such an approach “suspend[s] common sense,” Marci
Hamilton points to various examples of violence involving kirpans, and
argues that Sikh families might instead send their children to private schools
or home-school them, or suspend the practice of wearing a kirpan during
school hours, or simply “jettison[ ] the practice altogether.”200 Yet all the
examples of kirpan-related violence she cites appear to involve insulated and
insular segments of the Sikh community, not violence occurring within
schools or other public institutions. Her accommodation-skeptical approach,
rejecting categorically the kirpan practice and refusing to treat it as anything
other than an instrument of violence, is more likely to drive the Sikh community, or similarly situated communities, out of public institutions and into
insularity and resentment than to address the fear of illiberal practices and
their harms. As I have written elsewhere, “it may be that a pluralistic society
can do far more to reduce the threat of violence by welcoming dialogue and
participation . . . than by having no kirpans and no dialogue.”201

196 On the last interest, see LEITER, supra note 30, at 1–3. For discussion, see Michael
W. McConnell, Why Protect Religious Freedom?, 123 YALE L.J. 770, 799–802 (2013) (reviewing
LEITER, supra note 30).
197 MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW 116
(2005).
198 For relevant decisions, see for example Multani v. Commision Scolaire MargueriteBourgeoys, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256 (Can.), and Cheema v. Thompson, No. 94-16097, 1994 WL
477725 (9th Cir. Sept. 2, 1994).
199 Multani, [2006] 1 S.C.R. para. 131.
200 HAMILTON, supra note 197, at 115–16, 118.
201 HORWITZ, supra note 128, at 207.
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CONCLUSION
The immediate occasion for this Article is the fiftieth anniversary of
Dignitatis Humanae. It declares that that “the human person has a right to
religious freedom,” such that “no one is to be forced to act in a manner
contrary to his beliefs, whether privately or publicly,” and that this freedom
must be observed “within due limits.” This right applies both to individuals
acting alone and “when they act in community,” but with the caveat that “the
just demands of public order [must be] observed.”202 Its arguments are
religious but also “undoubtedly compatible with the liberalism reflected in
the American constitutional scheme.”203 On both understandings, accommodations of religion are subject to limitations—but they are and should be
available, at a minimum. On this view, religious groups ought to acknowledge the role of reasonable limitations to accommodation, and liberals ought
to acknowledge the general value and necessity of accommodation.
I have offered one argument—a pragmatic and liberal argument—in
favor of accommodation, one focusing on the danger that the refusal to
accommodate will encourage rather than erase illiberalism. Although I have
offered some suggestions about the spirit in which accommodations might be
undertaken, my primary goal has been to ensure that liberals have reasons of
their own not to forego the accommodation project altogether.
If liberals continue to squarely support religious accommodation in
principle and practice, even if they disagree with religious communities or
each other about the occasions for such accommodations and their limits,
then the need for a reminder of such an argument is concededly less urgent.
I do not think that religious liberty, including the availability of religious
accommodations in principle, is dramatically “under threat.”204 But neither
am I wholly convinced that the need for liberal reminders about the value
and viability of religious accommodation as such is non-existent, or that those
who perceive such a need are merely alarmists.
It is always difficult to tell whether a change in the degree of attachment
to a particular idea, or a disagreement over its application in a particular
charged case, represents a simple adjustment or something more wholesale
in nature. But my sense is that skepticism, resistance, and even opposition to
religious accommodation as such have risen substantially in liberal circles,
and that the momentum has shifted a great deal in a short time. If that is
right, then this reminder is needed.

202 Dignitatis Humanae, supra note 10.
203 John M. Breen, Neutrality in Liberal Legal Theory and Catholic Social Thought, 32 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 513, 539 (2009); see also JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 336 (1998).
204 Our First, Most Cherished Liberty: A Statement on Religious Liberty, U.S. CONF. CATHOLIC
BISHOPS (2012), http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/religious-liberty/our-first-mostcherished-liberty.cfm.

